The New Republic, December 1994

SPOILED
By Michael Maren
Acetylene torches tint the night sky on a sandy back street
in Mogadishu, less than 200 yards from the fortified United Nations
compound. Technicians working for faction leader Mohammed Farah
Aidid are mounting heavy caliber machine guns and rocket launchers
to the rear ends of Land Cruisers and pickup trucks to use in
the next phase of Somalia's civil war. The u.n. barracks, once
a base in the hunt for Aidid, now serve to deter any force that
might attempt to shut down Aidid's weapons workshop.
Tomorrow, a delegation from the UN Security Council will visit.
The u.n., it is widely known, will announce its intention to
end the Somalia operation by March 31, 1995. Neither Aidid nor
his rival, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, seems concerned over the impending
departure; both have shrugged off warnings from u.n. Special
Representative Victor Gbeho that this is the last chance for
negotiations before the United Nations Operation in Somalia (unosom)
mission pulls out. Neither seems any more willing to compromise
than he was the past five times unosom threatened to withdraw.
Over the past year it has become clear that the Somalis do
not view Unosom as a credible mediator, but rather as a big,
dumb cow to be milked. unosom has supplied thousands of jobs
in Mogadishu and other towns (every two weeks the UN buys up
about 20 percent of all the Somali currency in existence). Now,
with the departure imminent, the faction leaders are positioning
themselves to grab whatever spoils the u.n. leaves behind.
Aidid's side seems to be winning. Last August his soldiers
attacked a Zimbabwean contingent in the town of Beled Weyn. One
Zimbabwean was killed. The rest were stripped to their underwear.
Automatic weapons, mortars and armored personnel carriers valued
at more than $2 million were confiscated. (Since the Americans
left, the u.n. has lacked the transport capability to reinforce
any of its troops in the field.) Aidid apologized for killing
the soldier, kept the goods and continued to meet cordially with
Gbeho--who continued to express optimism that the u.n. could
broker a peace agreement. Meanwhile, Aidid has been complaining
about the u.n.'s failure to pay hotel bills that his delegation
ran up during months of stalled negotiations in Nairobi and Addis
Ababa.
Ever since the American forces left Mogadishu last March,
Somalis on the streets predicted that the Egyptians and other
Third World troops in Somalia were there only to do business.
It appears they were right. Security has collapsed. A few dollars
passed to sentries will buy anyone entrance inside the gates
of the port and airport to do business. As of last week, fifty-seven
brand-new four-wheel-drive vehicles had been sold to Somalis
by the security forces for between $3,000 and $5,000 apiece.
Some have turned up on the streets of Nairobi--their u.n. markings
faintly visible beneath fresh paint--where they fetch $50,000
to $60,000. Recently four tankers filled with gasoline were simply
driven out of the port, never to be seen again. Cash and goods
alike feed the arms build-up.
When the UN finally withdraws, the big prizes will be the
port, airport and the u.n. compound itself. Previously, Aidid
financed his war against Ali Mahdi by selling off what he had
looted in Mogadishu--plumbing, roofing, wires, monuments, office
equipment. The war ran down when they ran out of things to steal.
Now the u.n. has spent $160 million renovating the former U.S.
Embassy compound (which was completed at a cost of almost $40
million by the U.S. government just before Mogadishu descended
into chaos). Even after it became clear last summer that the
u.n. operation would be ending, the bureaucracy continued to
sink money into construction. A new airport terminal building
was recently completed. The latest make-work project inside the
eighty-acre compound has been to install speed bumps; apparently,
driving the same two miles of road day after day had made people
reckless. (You can walk across the compound in ten minutes.)
Aidid has insisted to the UN that it leave behind vehicles
and other valuable equipment, arguing that any "aid"
that comes into Somalia should belong to Somalis. Though the
request has struck many at the u.n. as impertinent, from the
Somali perspective the u.n. operation is inherently corrupt,
and u.n. bureaucrats are in Somalia only to enrich themselves.
They have seen little evidence to dissuade them.
In the past eight months Somalis have seen the UN bureaucracy
double to nearly 800 civilian personnel, even as humanitarian
activity halted. One UN worker in the humanitarian office said
she was "disgusted" with how little was going on. Most
UN employees, she complained, were just doing time there to help
them climb the u.n. career ladder. "A Somalia combat ribbon
looks good on the resume," she said.
A Somali employee in the same office was more bitter. Having
worked under five different foreigners at the humanitarian unit,
he said he finally had figured out that the expatriates were
interested only in collecting their daily subsistence allowance
of $100 or more per day, beyond their salary and perks. Somali
employees are lucky to get $300 per month.
The bill for the operation is now $4 million per day--one-third
of it supplied by the United States. Most of that pays for foreign
troops. Another large chunk has gone to foreign contractors such
as the Texas-based Brown & Root or Australia's Morris Catering.
Somali businessmen who have tried to deal with the u.n. have
complained that procurement officers demand kickbacks. Then there
is the $3.9 million in cash that disappeared from the u.n. compound
last April. None of the money has shown up, and it is generally
considered to have been an inside job.
The price tag might have been worth it if the UN were brokering
peace, but it's not. The two main factions are further apart
than ever, agreeing on almost nothing except that the UN special
representative is a joke. As negotiations have become more intricate,
the UN personnel in the country have less experience. No one
who was in Somalia last March remains, nor any trace of institutional
memory. And although Somali politics can't be mastered in a few
weeks, Gbeho seems to be missing even the simple points, further
thwarting reconciliation. One of the largest and most powerful
factions, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, held a congress
in August and elected General Mohammed Abshir Musa as chairman.
No one from the u.n. was present, but Gbeho somehow reported
back to New York that Abshir's rival, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf,
was chosen. The Security Council then published a report acknowledging
the chairmanship of Yusuf. The confusion turned out to be catastrophic,
since Yusuf belongs to Aidid's camp and Abshir to Ali Mahdi's.
Both factions now claim to include the Democratic Front, and
neither man can attend a conference where the other is chairman.
Now that Yusuf has been anointed by the u.n., he is unlikely
to compromise. (Several people from Aidid's side produced copies
of the Security Council report from their pockets to show me
when I raised the issue.)
Gbeho, who is from Ghana, has another problem not of his making:
Somalis in general show little respect for Africans. When speaking
English, people around Aidid and Ali Mahdi refer to Gbeho as
"that Ghanaian." When speaking Somali they use the
word adon, which means slave, a term in common use to
describe Africans with darker skin and coarser hair. That Gbeho's
assistant is also Ghanaian just proves to the conspiracy-minded
Somalis that the u.n. is up to no good. The logic runs like this:
first the Westerners came in and took their piece of the u.n.
loot. Then the Egyptians, Malaysians and other Third World countries
got their shot. Now lowly African countries are picking up the
crumbs as the operation winds down. The Somali share so far has
been small.
For two years foreign optimists have been proclaiming peace
at hand in Somalia because the factions were tired of fighting.
In truth, they had run out of resources. Now, $4 billion later
and with the UN's help, they are rested, rearmed and ready to
fight again.
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