As Congress began its debate on welfare reform last March, a
group of Democratic congressmen entered the House chamber wearing
colorful neckties adorned with child-like drawings. Women members
wore similarly painted scarves. On several occasions President
Bill Clinton has been seen wearing the same type of ties, and
the vice president owns at least one. Larry King wore one of
the ties when he interviewed the president and vice president
together recently on CNN. So far, Republicans seem to have rejected
the style.
The ties and scarves , designed by children, are promoted as
a fundraising project by the charity Save the Children, which
keeps fifty-seven cents of the $27.50 retail price to use for
its work. But that, of course, is not the reason to buy them.
Rather, the ties are worn as a very public declaration of concern
for children. In the American realpolitik, that translates into
support of the Democrats' policies to change welfare as opposed
to the Republicans' plans to cut it back and hand over what's
left in block grants to the states . While Save the Children
doesn't involve itself in partisan disputes, they are clearly
proud that their organization has been acknowledged in Washington
as a symbol for the welfare of children.
What the Democrats don't realize, however, is that dangling beneath
their chins may be the best of all arguments against the Republican
initiative. If they would stop grandstanding in the name of children
for a moment, they might find in Save the Children a real case
against legislation that would shift part of the administration
of assistance programs from government to private hands. The
reality behind this child-centered charity is a lesson for anyone
who thinks that private organizations are by definition more
efficient, compassionate, or effective than big government.
Most people know Save the Children from its recent print ads
which ask people to "help stop a different kind of child
abuse" and from its television advertisements, the ones
that now feature former All in the Family star Sally Struthers
pleading on behalf of poor children who, she explains, are waiting
for you to step forward and become a sponsor. Struthers' plaintive
voice drifts over horrific images of fly-covered starving children.
Then with the lens tightly focused on one child, she informs
the public that all it takes to redeem this child from a life
of poverty is twenty dollars a month, sixty-five cents a day.
Your decision right now about whether or not to pick up the phone
and take out your credit card will determine if this child lives
or dies.
The ads seem to have been on the air for years, though Struthers
has only worked for Save the Children since January, 1994. Before
that, for 17 years, she delivered a nearly identical plea for
Christian Children's Fund, another organization that raises funds
through sponsorship. (It appears that much of the public thought
Struthers was working for Save the Children all along.) A number
of Save the Children staffers , especially those in fundraising,
thought the veteran pitchwoman was past her prime and doubted
very much that her residual celebrity would translate to positive
numbers on Save's bottom line. "She was delivered to us
as a fait accompli," recalls Sally Franz, who used to work
for Save as a fundraiser.
But the move had the support of the senior staff at the organization
including Save's new president, Dr. Charles MacCormack. MacCormack
(Everyone calls him Charlie.) had taken over a year earlier at
a time when the organization desperately needed strong leadership,
a new direction, and a calming influence. His predecessor, James
Bausch, had been hounded from office by a vicious staff rebellion
waged with innuendo, personal attacks -- including anonymous
threatening letters to his wife -- and leaks to the press about
the ostentatious waste of sponsorship funds. Bausch was said
to have been an embarrassment to the organization after it was
revealed that his salary and benefits added up to more than $300,000
a year. The leaks became so bad that Bausch came in one day and
had all the fax machines disconnected. When Bausch finally left
he took with him a $225,000 severance package that itself became
an issue of contention and led to the resignation of at least
one board member, writer Michael Dorris, and a lot of bad feelings.
MacCormack, who had been on the board at the time, was not active
in the coup, but he now leads the organization with an executive
staff partly composed of the people who were.
With their new leadership, higher visibility, and new celebrity
spokeswoman, Save now believes that the controversies are in
the past, and they can get back to the business of helping children.
Westport, Connecticut is among the wealthiest towns in America.
Its shoreline, by Long Island Sound, is rimmed with multi-million-dollar
mansions. Westport's Main Street runs along the Saugatuck River
and is lined with upscale boutiques such as Laura Ashley , Brooks
Brothers and Barney's. Over the past fifteen years it has been
transformed from a quiet New England town to a less understated,
more New York, kind of suburb where, according to the complaints
of one Westport native, the wives of big city executives drive
the streets in expensive cars speaking on their cellular phones.
Save the Children's headquarters sits just across the river from
Main Street in a two-story former school building that once housed
the Famous Writers' and Famous Artists' Schools. The building
is actually three separate structures, awkwardly joined, each
built in a different decade from the 1950s through the 70s. Just
beyond the reception area is Save the Children's gift shop, where
the ties and scarves can be purchased along with a wide selection
of Third World crafts.
The goods are generic in a multicultural way, mute ambassadors
from Africa, Asia, Latin America. The charity's more distinctive
products are tacked on a bulletin board outside the shop's entrance.
Little red-and-white folders resembling greeting cards contain
photos and thumbnail descriptions of children. Each bears the
Save the Children corporate icon, a Gumby-like cutout of a child
with its hands raised; employees refer to the symbol as red baby
Jesus, or just RBJ. Below the folders a hastily hand-written
sign reads: Choose a Child. Inquire at Desk.
This combination of generic Third Worldness, corporate imagery,
and the sad faces of distant but real human beings sums up the
charity's peculiar appeal. Its goals are satisfyingly broad --
simply "the children" -- yet achingly specific: Each
sponsor receives, so to speak, a child. The sponsor can track
the child's transformation with cards and letters from the child
and through progress reports from Save the Children. The organization
pioneered this fundraising technique with Appalachian children
in the 1930s. It has since been adopted by dozens of other charities
around the world. (World Vision, Children Incorporated, Childreach,
Plan International, and others use sponsorship.) As a way to
raise money it is unparalleled. Sponsorship links the donor directly
to a needy sad-eyed target of the charity's work, rather than
to a faceless fund-raiser at the end of a solicitation letter.
The charity's bureaucracy becomes invisible. The sponsor feels
connected to an actual person and will believe that his or her
money, or most of it, will be going to help that child.
But sponsorship is a con game. And as in any con game, the mark,
in this case the sponsor, is duped into believing the improbable
because his or her judgment is clouded by the possibility of
getting something valuable on the cheap. Anyone thinking clearly
about the miserable poverty of the children in these ads would
have to conclude that twenty dollars a month, sixty-five cents
a day, is not by itself enough to substantially alter the oppressive
environments they inhabit -- especially since much of that money
has to be used to pay for more TV ads, cover the costs of the
charity's bureaucracy, and maintain the links between Save's
more than 100,000 individual sponsors and their children. What
sponsors are really buying, is, as stated in Save's brochures,
a sense of well-being and "deep satisfaction." That's
a real bargain at $20 a month, but it doesn't leave much for
the children. The pitch that is so appealing to donors, seems
absurd when one is in the field confronting the challenges of
economic development. And it puts Save in a bind: If they ignore
some of the sponsored children, they can do more effective work
for the others. If they try to do something for everyone, they
run the risk of accomplishing nothing at all. Its commitment
to sponsors clashes with its promise to the children.
Save the Children enjoys one of the best reputations in the charity
business. As it announces in its own advertising, "Today,
Save the Children is one of the most respected relief and development
organizations in the world...." That is certainly true. Money magazine, in its annual ranking of charities last
year, rated them third among relief and development charities
and noted that 82.1 percent of its expenditures were used for
"program services." According to Save's tax forms for
the 1994 fiscal year, that number is up to 82.9 percent, which
may push the organization higher in this year's rankings. The
new numbers show nearly 80.5 million dollars going to "program,"
from total revenues of over 97 million dollars collected from
more than 100,000 sponsors. Save every year prints a pie chart
divided into three slices. The two little slices are always fundraising
and management. The big slice, always more than 80 percent, is
"Program Services." The pie chart is packed into all
of Save's promotional mailings and proudly displayed in all the
pamphlets hanging from the bulletin board.
Charlie MacCormack is proud of that pie chart and of the sponsorship
program, which he regards as the real strength of Save the Children.
Sponsors are not driven, he said, by the "crisis du jour"
Instead they become interested in the child. "If they're
supporting a child in activity in Bangladesh, and they're gonna
stay for 10, 12, 14 years whether Bangladesh is in the newspapers
or not." This solves one of the biggest problems relief
and development organizations face: If they start raising money
for a calamity in Rwanda or Somalia, by the time the funds are
gathered and dispersed, the worst of the emergency has usually
passed and the organization is sitting with millions of dollars
earmarked for one place while a new crisis is forming somewhere
else. Sponsorship is a steady and predictable source of operational
funds.
MacCormack's office is located in the second-floor beside what
Save employees call the fishbowl, a conference room with large
windows opening up to the river, and a glass inside wall that
allows sunlight reflected from the water to fill the wide corridor
lined with Save's executive offices. From the windows, of his
sparsely furnished office MacCormack can see the back side of
shops along Westport's main street and watch the water rise and
fall with the tide.
MacCormack is 54 years with gray hair and mustache, rosy cheeks
and a round face. He speaks clearly and quietly in calm tones.
When he talks about the children, a thin smile breaks across
his face and his voice radiates warmth. The goal of Save the
Children, MacCormack began, "is making better lives for
children." What followed was a well-rehearsed recitation
of good works and lofty goals; but nothing much more specific
or quantitative than making better lives for children.
When pressed for more concrete details MacCormack's relaxed confidence
wavered somewhat and then became completely shaken when I began
to ask questions about Save the Children's financing, questions
about the pie chart. It is the deception inherent in the pie
chart that provides the key to unraveling the con game that is
Save the Children.
The pie chart is misleading in two ways: First, it tracks the
proportion of all expenditures that go to program, not the proportion
of all donations. The distinction is probably lost to potential
sponsors, who might naturally assume that the pie chart is a
representation of how their donations are being spent. But most
of Save's funding comes not from individual sponsors but from
U.S. government and United Nations project grants. Expenditures
are nearly three times donations, so even if Save spent none
of the sponsors' money on programs, they could still find a way
to claim that 75 percent of the money they spend is going to
program services. The pie chart really says nothing about how
sponsors' money is spent.
The second misleading thing is neither the pie chart nor the
pamphlet explain exactly what "program services are."
The reason Save the Children and Money emphasize the program
services statistic is, presumably, that it is seen as a rough
approximation for "money that actually helps people,"
as opposed to funds spent on overhead and fundraising expenses.
"Program," one would assume, is what should go to the
children in the folders. Why else trot out the statistic to use
for rankings and as pie charts in promotional literature?
But Save's idea of "program" is probably broader than
that of its sponsors. In fiscal 1994, it included nearly $4.5
million for travel, $3.5 million for supplies, $15.5 million
for salaries, and $2.2 million for rents. Save's non-public financial
statements show that film, holiday cards for sponsors, the gift
shop, and craft catalog were also charged to program expenses.
The total of the sponsors' dollars that actually went in grants
to field programs was 45.1 million, less than 50 percent. In
turn, just over half of that money was given in grants to other
organizations to actually implement projects. Those organizations
presumably have their own salaries and administrative expenses
to pay as well. None of that is reflected in Save's official
representations.
Over the last few years, the pie chart has been more than an
illustration used in Save the Children's advertising. It has
been a contentious issue within the organization. Last year Save's
general counsel convinced the organization to remove it from
print ads because it put them in violation of solicitation laws.
Beyond that, a number of Save staffers and employees have begun
to suspect that the organization is more concerned with keeping
the proportions of the pie chart intact than with actually helping
children.
I asked MacCormack how he thought sponsors might interpret the
organization's statements about the amounts of money going to
"program:" "When they see that on average 82%
goes to programming, well, they think that's great," he
said. "They think that's what it ought to be."
"Do you think they understand that program includes rents
and salaries?"
"Well, first, I mean, 82% is going to the program, on average,
of all-----of the hundred million that comes in here.. 82 million
goes to program. .. But then if you look at everything that goes
in and everything that goes out, 82.7 million goes to... to the
program. So that is, that's correct." MacCormack seemed
to have expected the question while at the same time he acted
as if he were puzzled by it. This was the reaction of all the
Save executives I spoke with that day: It was as if no one had
ever been thickheaded enough to raise that issue before.
But that specific question had come up frequently, from people
within and outside the organization. And MacCormack himself had
been concerned enough about the deception to raise it in a letter
to Save the Children's board of directors. In fact, there are
hundreds of pages of reports and memos from within Save the Children
revealing that its top executives have long been aware that the
organization is not delivering on its promises. The documents
also suggest that Save has expended more energy patching up it
public image than it has improving the projects for the children.
A year before I'd met with MacCormack, an internal report by
a Save the Children consultant had specifically examined the
question of how sponsors' money was being spent. The consultant,
Shelby Miller, is a recognized authority in the field of early
childhood development, and someone with much more than an outsider's
view of Save the Children. For six years she had been a program
officer for the Ford Foundation, supervising grants made to Save.
When we met early one morning at a New York diner, she prefaced
our discussion by telling me that she'd only agreed to talk because
Save had done nothing to address the problems she'd found a year
earlier despite the fact that she made a series of detailed recommendations
for improving Save's programs.
Her criticisms fell into two broad and related categories, developmental
and operational.
Discussing Save the Children's operations, Miller's report says
the actual amount and proportion of sponsorship dollar that reached
the children is "woefully inadequate." While sponsorship
is an effective tool for raising money, it requires a tremendous
amount of administration to track all the individual children,
a fact that Miller pointed out in her report: "Typically,
there is little or no relationship between those arranging sponsorship
and those administering services. However, a huge amount of staff
and volunteer time is devoted to the maintenance of sponsorship."
In our conversation, Miller described this as a chasm between
what sponsorship means to donors and what it means to the children
and their communities. "The chasm has a big price tag. On
the sponsor side, you're sold the concept that for $20 a month
or whatever it costs, we're going to transform this kid's life
through all these kinds of strategies - or whatever it is they
put in the ads. On sponsored family side, it's sold as whatever
it takes to sign them up; but it's a much more minimalist promise."
On the developmental side, she said that Save lacked "a
commonly accepted and understood theoretical perspective"
on which to carry on and evaluate its own work. It's not enough
to just say you're helping children. Childhood development is
a science, Miller explained. There's no room for a sentimental,
noblesse oblige, pity-the-poor approach to the work. "Programs
must be carried out over long periods with demonstrations and
models and constant analysis to find out what works. Then the
programs must be focused. Few of Save's projects fit these criteria.
It's because of a lack of commitment. Save has no detailed objectives,
no strategy. It's a freeing experience if you can commit to a
strategy. If you know what you do, you don't waste time and money.
Then you can commit 80-90 percent of your time on what you want
to achieve." The bottom line is this: Save the Children's
projects don't work.
Miller's anger with Save the Children is not over the duping
of sponsors. It comes from two types of damage she sees the organization
doing in the field of childhood development. First, at a time
when funds are in short supply, Save is spending money to create
the illusion that it's helping. And secondly, Save is spreading
the idea that it's easy and cheap to change the lives of children.
"We know how to help kids," Miller said. "We do.
The models and methods are there. The fact is that is cost $4-5,00
a year for a preschool intervention. The research has been done.
With very few exceptions, Save isn't delivering. Their approach
to development work is totally scattershot. The problem with
Save is that they're wasting resources and goodwill, and they're
doing it in the name of children." Miller's annoyance grew
as she spoke.
She concluded our first conversation with the suggestion that
maybe Save the Children should just liquidate all its assets
and make a block grant to another agency that is doing some good
somewhere.
When I raised Miller's report in my meeting with MacCormack he
briefly stared out the window. His face grew red and then said
"I haven't read it, so I can't say there but certainly,
the sort of the arguments are, that you can't get enough out
into the communities... I don't know whether she makes this argument
or not, but you can't get the development results, you know...And
if that's what's said, then that I wouldn't agree with."
Whether or not he actually read a report that his organization
spent $15,000 to produce, MacCormack did know what I was talking
about. It was an issue had been repeatedly brought to his attention
by Save the Children's in-house attorney and at least once by
the organization's outside auditor.
And MacCormack himself, in the spring of 1993, was extremely
worried about the amount of money that the organization was able
to deliver to projects. At that time he visited Christian Children's
Fund at their headquarters in Richmond, Virginia. MacCormack
was with familiar company there because CCF now employs a group
of former Save the Children staffers including, at that time,
its president, Paul McCleary . The purpose of the trip was to
do some fact finding and compare notes. When MacCormack returned
to Westport he wrote a concerned memo to the board of directors.
It began with the usual self-congratulations:"Save the Children
takes justifiable pride in the fact that between 80-85% of our
income goes to program services." Then the tone quickly
shifts as it focuses on the central problem that has long haunted
the organization: "However, this is an average figure. It
masks the fact that some of our income streams go 100% to program
... For example, our food aid is 100% program and our public
funding from the U.S. government and the United Nations probably
averages 90% to program. This means that, on average, a much
smaller percent of our private revenues are allocated to programs,"
he wrote. In other words, 80 percent of a sponsor's contribution
does not go to program expenses, even under the organization's
broad definition of what program services are.
MacCormack's concern here is not with finding a way to get more
money to programs, but with Save the Children's image. He's worried
about the pie chart, not about the children.
As the memo continues, MacCormack eases his own concerns by invoking
the magic word, leverage: "In general, we use these private
funds to leverage other sources of funding, thus achieving a
multiplier effect on terms of our private donations." This
concept of leverage was raised in every conversation I had at
Save the Children. What it means is that Save receives grants,
mostly from the U.S. government, that it must use in very specific
ways on specific projects. These are restricted funds. Even though
a sponsor donates money to Save the Children with a specific
child in mind, sponsorship funds are really the only unrestricted
assets Save has. Save has no obligation to spend the money on
the sponsor's child, in that child's village, or on projects
at all. Save in fact uses those funds to pay for administering
the restricted money it gets from the government. That's leverage.
The relative calm that MacCormack conveyed to the board was missing
from a memo written a day earlier to the files: Our Save the
Children 'alumni' at CCF consider our situation 'a disaster waiting
to happen,' he wrote. "As communities often receive a
small portion of the sponsor's contributed dollar, they are obviously
going to ask questions about where the money goes. All the explaining
in the world would not make this question go away or our own
strategy look good in an investigative report." Again,
he's focused on making his operation "look good."
If MacCormack had any concerned about the small amounts of sponsorship
money getting to the field, a year later he hadn't done much
about it. Shelby Miller produced her damning report in April,
1994 and then on May 6, 1994, Pamela R. Winnick, Save the Children's
in-house counsel, returned from a tour of the organization's
projects and wrote a memo to the board of directors, revealing:
1. In some of our programs, no sponsored children are receiving
benefits.
2. Even in our best programs (e.g. Kentucky), only 60% of the
sponsored children appear to receive any benefit.
In this memo, Winnick is clearly in MacCormack's camp, worried
about Save the Children's public image. She wrote that she was
anxious to put Save in a "defensible position in the event
of an investigation by a government agency and/or media."
But over the next months she would visit more projects and discover
that Save the Children's only concern was their image. A series
of memos and letter document her growing disillusionment and
frustration with Save the Children.
Winnick first sought confidential outside legal advice from Daniel
L. Kurtz, an attorney in private practice who had once served
as Assistant Attorney General in Charities Bureau of the New
York State Attorney General's office. Kurtz reviewed Save's fund
raising materials and compared them with the reality of the organizations
projects. He sent his opinion back to Save: "We believe
that the situation at present is likely to constitute a substantial
violation of state solicitation laws." Kurtz warned of serious
problems for the board and recommended that Save change its advertising,
which would solve the problem in the short run, until it could
change its programs to more closely approximate the claims being
made for how funds were spent.
Winnick apparently tried to coax the organization toward revising
those claims. A month later, on June 15, she wrote a memo advising
that callers to Save's 800 number be told "83% of SC's overall
expenditures goes to program services," as opposed to 83
percent of donations. But if callers insist on knowing more,
they should be forwarded to Westport. "Under no circumstances
can we make the direct representation that 83% of the sponsorship
dollar goes to programs."
In the Summer of 1994, Save's outside law firm, Day, Berry &
Howard of Hartford addressed Winnick's concerns. Their assessment
was much more measured and diplomatic, but echoed Winnick's opinions.
Thomas J. Groark Jr. of Day, Berry, & Howard also checked
with KPMG Peat Marwick, Save's outside auditors. Edward J. Molloy,
a partner in the accounting firm, wrote to Groark on June 30,
1994. He said in his letter that he had been in contact with
Najeeb Halaby, the chairman of Save's board of directors. "I
indicated to Mr. Halaby that there was increasing pressure on
all non-profit organization to provide donors with accountability
for their donation and in this regard, I saw even more pressure
on SC....I expressed my concern on the frequency with which problems
kept surfacing. It was obvious that in many programs a gap existed
between what was said and what was done.
"In my mind, the sponsorship program is a very difficult
and expensive program to administer and, can go wrong very quickly..."
Molloy mentions several times in his letter that senior management
is aware of the problems and is in the process of correcting
them.
On July 7, 1994 Winnick wrote back to the board members : "While
I commend Day, Berry & Howard and senior management for concluding
that there exist problems with sponsorship, I must, with all
due respect, take issue with the implicit conclusion that the
problems are being resolved in any significant manner."
She restated the problem: "Even our best U.S. field office,
Appalachia, using volunteers and community workers, spends 30%
of sponsorship money on actual programs. It does not appear that
we will ever exceed that amount in the U.S. In Senior Management
Team meetings, the figure of $60-70 per sponsored child (25-30%
of the sponsorship dollar) seems to have evolved as the optimal
amount.
"According to the analysis prepared by Program Operations
actual program deliver in Bridgeport will be $22.82 per sponsored
child in FY '94, under 10% of the sponsorship dollars attributable
to that site. Further, in that location, a significant proportion
of sponsored children will not be served by that office."
Winnick writes of the Waltersville Elementary School in Bridgeport,
CT with 4000 sponsored children, which should have generated
$96,000 sponsorship donations in that year. "I visited that
school on June 8, 1994 and learned that for over two years, no
benefits whatsoever have gone to this school. In July 1994, a
check in the amount of $10,800 (barely 10% of the aggregate amount
attributable to the 400 children) will be given to the school
for an 'academic Olympics,' a writing contest for all 840 children
who attend that school. In a city such as Bridgeport, is this
an appropriate use of sponsorship money, both qualitatively and
quantitatively?"
Winnick continues: "In light of examples such as Bridgeport,
our presentation of sponsorship is highly misleading. The Sponsorship
Guide, our communication with sponsors, states that '[Y]our sponsored
child begins benefiting from your support right away -- perhaps
through nutritious food and clean drinking water ... education
... basic health care....' and '[Y]our continued presence in
this young life can mean the difference between sickness and
health, illiteracy and education,' and that '[o]ver 84 cents
of every dollar we raise goes directly to benefit needy girls
and boys.' Television ads featuring Sally Struthers promise that
65 cents a day will bring 'lasting benefits' to communities and
'help rescue one girl or boy.' How does a writing competition
'rescue' a little girl or boy?"
In the same memo Winnick reminds the board members that "The
rules of the Better Business Bureau clearly state that 'at least
50%' of public contributions be spent on the programs and activities
described in solicitation, in accordance with donor expectations."
In the Fall of 1994, Winnick left Save the Children for "ethical
reasons," as she explained in a statement issued through
her attorney. "During my tenure, I became concerned, both
legally and morally, about their fundraising practices and undertook
my own investigation. I presented my findings to Dr. MacCormack
and then to the Board of Directors."
Delores Tootsie and Phyllis Wittsel were trying to remember what
it was like when they were sponsored children on the Hopi reservation
in the 60s. The sisters didn't recall much. Those were the check-to-child
days when Save sent a portion of the sponsor's donation directly
to the children. Check-to-child was phased out in the late seventies
and early eighties. They remember getting ten dollars every three
months or so that they would use to buy a new pair of shoes or
some school supplies. Then Phyllis suddenly recalled getting
a copy of the soundtrack from the movie, Help from her sponsor,
a Beatles fan club, though she can't remember where they were
from.
We were having lunch at the tribe-owned restaurant, on the northern
Arizona reservation just outside of the town of Kykotsmovi, which
everyone calls K-Town. The town is a collection of ramshackle
buildings and mobile homes on a gentle rise emerging from the
Arizona desert. It's just off the main road, and not a place
where the tourists stop. Road signs direct them past the town
to the Hopi cultural center, restaurant, bookstore, and museum.
In the middle of the morning the town was completely silent.
The most modern building in town is the two-story tribal council
headquarters where Delores works in the personnel department.
The patrons of the restaurant were evenly divide between Hopis
and tourists. As it was the only restaurant for miles, the dining
room was hectic and loud. Many of the Hopis there seemed to know
each other and many worked for the tribe, the only real employer
around. The sisters were soft-spoken and well-dressed women in
their 40s. Dee was more talkative but more cautious about what
she said.
I asked them if sponsorship had changed their lives in anyway.
They both laughed. But, Dee, explained, families whose kids are
being sponsored now would rather go back to check-to-child days.
"At least that way they know where the money is going,"
she said.
Both sisters have worked with Save the Children recently. Dee
was a community development coordinator for Save from 1988 until
the end of 1992. And though Phyllis doesn't work for Save, her
job on her village development committee puts her in charge of
Save's project there.
"Westport was never really satisfied," Dee said. "People
here wanted funding for cultural type programs. They wanted to
hire Hopi people to come and teach about Hopi things. Save wanted
more visible projects. They were more interested in Christmas
parties and Easter egg hunts. The parties were to serve as enrollment
drives as well or as vehicles to gather already sponsored children
to update their status for sponsor reports."
Tootsie figures that on average, Save's project grants were in
the area of $1,800 for a year. That would be in a village of
some 50 or sixty sponsored children averaging $35 or less per
child per year. (Those same sponsored kids would have generated
more than $10,000 a year for Save the Children's administrative
costs.) From here the gap between "program expenditures"
was very real. While Save the Children might consider its executives'
salary to be legitimate program costs, only the sum of cash available
for projects made much difference here.
Each year the local committees would have to produce a project
proposal that Save would choose to either fund or return for
changes. Year to year, the projects were unconnected. One year
a playground might be built, the next year funds might be raised
for a summer program for the children. But then there would be
no money to maintain the playground.
"They would start projects that were never completed,"
Tootsie said. "A greenhouse project was started one year.
The greenhouse was built but there were no funds available to
keep it going. It's sitting there unused. There is playground
equipment still stored. In my village there is a foundation for
a warehouse that's been there for years ."
It was a complaint I'd heard at two other Arizona sites I visited.
The Save grants were so small that they would be used for little
treats for the kids, not for serious developmental purposes.
At the Gila River reservation outside of Phoenix, for example,
Jeff Williams, who works for the council there, told me that
Save's funds one year covered a couple of weekend trips to a
swimming pool in the summer for 56 sponsored children.
Williams, whose Sacaton community will be phased out this year
seemed not to care very much. I asked him if losing Save the
Children would hurt the community? Williams shook his head.
"Has Save changed the lives of anyone here?"
"No, nothing has changed."
"Did they ever provide medical care?"
"No."
"Education?"
"No. It's fluff. We're not losing much."
Williams told me I should talk with Christine Thomas, who used
to work in Save the Children's Phoenix office as a donor services
coordinator, the liaison between sponsors and the children. Thomas
lives on the Gila River reservation outside of Phoenix, just
past the point where the air-conditioned shopping mall culture
of the city stops and the rural emptiness of the reservation
begins. She commuted into Phoenix every day where one of her
jobs was to open all the mail that passed between sponsors and
children, mostly for the protection of the child, but also to
prevent kids from asking sponsors for horses and cars and things
that might alienate them. She would often send letters back to
be rewritten. She also spent a lot of her time driving around
delivering packages that sponsors would send to the kids. Shelby
Miller referred to this as the Pony Express problem. Because
of the vast distances between projects, people from the branch
offices could spend ten hours driving just to drop off a small
package of clothes.
"We're not benefiting all sponsored children," she
said right from the start. "We're not. We never have been."
Thomas said that when she went into the field she found some
sponsored kids were 19 or 20 years old and were raising families
of their own. "Some of them -- quite a few -- don't realize
they're being sponsored. And a lot of the children aren't needy.
The pressure is on from headquarters: We're given a month to
sign up so many children or our budgets will be cut. So we signed
up anyone who came through the door. As long as the sponsor doesn't
ask then there's really no problem according to Save the Children."
This was also a reaction that Delores Tootsie got when she first
went into the communities. Thomas confirmed how little money
was actually getting out to the villages. "Save doesn't
like the communities asking where the money goes. I know several
cases -- like Blackwater -- where we phased out because communities
asked too many questions."
And then some of what little money they had was spent on what
many regarded as frivolous activity. According to Thomas and
others, communities were told to use some of the available money
to celebrate Save the Children's Founder's Day every May. The
parties were designed as recruiting tools. "We were told
it was mandatory," she said.
Thomas lost her job at then end of March when the Phoenix was
closed down as a cost-cutting measure. According to Thomas, sponsor
notification letters went out on March 24. "We had known
since October, but we were instructed not to tell anyone."
When communities phoned the Phoenix office to ask questions,
they got a recording saying the number had been disconnected.
Even as they were making plans to close the office, Save was
still recruiting children and was distributing a flyer around
Gila River, which read:
Sponsorship
Brings
$$$
Into Your Community
No one familiar with Save the Children found it surprising that
they would still be looking for children while phasing out their
programs. Recipients long ago seem to have accepted the fact
that there is no connection between program and sponsorship.
"What you've got is a system built on the backs of low income
communities," Shelby Miller said. In fact, Save seems to
be less of a development agency than a professional fundraising
operation, but with one big difference. No professional fundraiser
could get away with keeping 80 percent of the gross.
Save's rationale for spending most of the money in Westport,
for charging executive salaries against "program,"
is that people in Westport do "programming." But there
was little evidence of Save's hand in any of the development
projects I saw in Arizona or anywhere else. In Brooklyn's Bed-Sty
neighborhood, for example, Save was a relatively minor contributor
to the Tabernacle Elementary school. The small, private school
supplied 325 children to Save's sponsors, and Save returned $16,000
a year, about 20 percent of the $78,000 it would have collected.
The money was a tiny part of Tabernacle's budget, but it did
help slightly reduce the tuition costs for students' families.
Save never did any "programming" but they did hang
a Red Baby Jesus outside the school, and would often show the
school off as an example of its inner city projects. They were,
in essence, trading photographs and biographies of their children
for a small annual cash allotment.
In all the years that Save has worked on the Hopi reservation,
Dee Tootsie can recall lots of activity aimed at signing up kids
but can name only one or two projects that ever did any good.
She doesn't remember ever getting any guidance or programmatic
assistance from Save the Children, only pressure to sign up more
children and keep the reports coming. One of the final insults
in 1992 was when Save had turned down projects in eight villages
, and the committees failed to come up with any proposals acceptable
to Save the Children. According to the rules, if a community
can't spend the allocation by the end of the fiscal year, the
funds are lost. They can't for example, wait two years and do
a larger project. As time was running out, Save suggested a solution.
So in 1992 several hundred children in villages received gift
certificates to Wal-Mart for denominations of between 10 and
$25 dollars. The store was located in Gallup, New Mexico, some
90 miles away. Dee Tootsie typed up the gift certificates and
delivered them herself. Then she resigned.
Based on her sister's experience Phyllis Wittsel wasn't anxious
to get involved with Save, but 35 sponsored kids and budget of
$1,850 fell into her lap. Last Spring they submitted a proposal
for a summer program for the kids, designed to keep them away
from drugs and other problems that are common on reservations.
The community wanted recreation equipment and arts and crafts
supplies, and electronic learning games. The proposal was submitted
late, in June of 1994. The Save office in Gallup said that it
would take a few days to cut the check. But the money never came,
and the village ran the program anyway, ending in late July.
Two weeks after the program ended they were contacted by Save,
which told them that the money had been converted into a $1,700
credit at that same Wal-Mart in Gallup. They had two days to
spend the money or lose the funds. "We couldn't find anything
we needed," Wittsel says. "So we called Save and asked
if we could spend the money somewhere else and were told no.
Get a VCR, or a TV they told us. Save only cared that the money
was spent."
Arizona is unquestionably the worst Save the Children has to
offer. Its internal documents show that only $21.54 per child
reached the field in 1993 out of the $240 donated. But, according
to the same document, other regions didn't fare that much better.
Appalachia $67.22
Bridgeport 25.18
New Mexico 38.59
Southeast 26.05
Southwestern 24.36
Mississippi Delta 44.07
On average that comes out to $35.29 per child across the U.S.
(The Appalachian program, which Save considers to be its best,
is also it's oldest. One of the reasons why the numbers look
better is that half of the 6000 sponsored children have two sponsors.)
"Get this," Wittsel said as we were finishing lunch,
"A couple of months ago Save the Children sent us a plaque
in a Save the Children tote bag. The plague sad `In appreciation
of excellence' or something like that. I don't know what it was
for. Maybe they thought it was necessary to do something."
Similar stories emerged from Save the Children's overseas programs.
One former country director described how upon starting his new
job learned that most of the sponsored children in his program
were receiving nothing more than Save the Children T-shirts,
hats, and invitations to parties. When he eliminated the toys
and games, fewer than half the children enrolled in sponsorship
programs were receiving anything at all.
MacCormack didn't dispute the figures but insisted that I wasn't
telling the whole story. Westport, he said, delivers much more
than sponsorship dollars. He offered two examples.
"We are looking at a kind of emergency response, early childhood
center kit to jump start early childhood programs after floods
and earthquakes and other natural disasters. And we have learned
that what children most need at that time is a re-establishment
of continuity, of normalcy. They need to kind of get back into
their regular lives. And so we've put a trunk together that has
coloring books, crayons, disinfectant, plastic sheets, toys,
etc."
The kits, however, don't exist yet. And when they are put together,
most children won't be able to benefit from them anyway. But,
beyond that, the emergency kits are exactly the kinds of programs
that Save needs for the pie chart. The materials are donated
by companies that are able to write off the full wholesale value
of the materials. That value then becomes a donation to Save
the Children which can register it as a donation that goes 100
percent to "program" to counterbalance sponsorship
funds used for administration.
MacCormack's other "major example," was the "Eyes
on the Future" program, which provided eyeglasses on Indian
reservations. On the phone, MacCormack told me that sponsorship
paid for the program, but later his office sent me a fact sheet
that contradicted that claim noting that it turned out that eyeglass
frames were donated by ClearVision optical Company, tools and
materials came from the American Optometry Association and Hilsinger
Corp. The total value put on the in-kind contributions was $500,000.
Again, that's one hundred percent in and one hundred percent
out to beef up the pie chart.
"The Eyes on the Future program was dreadful," said
Connie DiLego, who worked for Save the Children as a full-time
volunteer on the Navajo reservation in Tuba City, Arizona. "It
was just awful. This was a one-time deal, not a commitment to
eye care."
DiLego had moved to Tuba City from Massachusetts to do volunteer
work with the Navajo. At first she thought Save the Children
was the perfect vehicle but rapidly soured on the organization.
For her, Eyes on the Future was typical of Save's programs: "We
were informed there was going to be an eye exam plus free eyeglasses.
They were also supposed to examine the elderly, which I thought
was wonderful. When the day came hundreds of people showed up.
I think they were a bit overwhelmed. People were supposed to
get glasses within a month or two. We waited well over a year
in some cases and then some glasses came with the wrong prescriptions.
They wouldn't mail them to the people directly so we had to go
to Gallup to pick them up."
So many people began calling the Tuba city office that DiLego
started handing out the 800 number in Gallup. "You've got
a 70 or 80-year old couple calling Gallup, and they're told they
have to drive four hours to pick up their glasses. Many of these
people don't have cars or can't afford the gas if they do. Then
Save said they were going to start charging for the glasses.
It seemed that they were making up the rules as they were going
along."
DiLego also pointed out that many children had grown or had their
prescriptions change while waiting for their glasses to show
up. And, since it wasn't a long term commitment from Save the
Children, there's no telling where the kids are going to get
glasses next year. Children who broke their glasses or outgrew
them couldn't count on getting a new pair.
"It seemed to me that the child didn't matter," DiLego
said. "The children were a means to their end. And the end
was their pie chart. It didn't matter if Jeffrey Yazzie had shoes
or not." In response to a question, DiLego said, "I'm
trying to think if there is one kid whose life was changed who's
going to have a better future because of what Save the Children
did. No, I honestly can't. I can't name any one person about
whom I can say his or her life was changed."
And it is "lasting, positive change in the lives of children
worldwide" that Save the Children sells to sponsors in ads
in newspapers and magazines across the country. Those ads always
feature photographs of emaciated or disfigured children in the
most extreme conditions, not the children that Save usually works
with. Almost everyone I spoke with on the reservations felt stigmatized
by the ads. "In earlier times, sponsored families in the
United States were not that likely to see Save's advertising,
because of the absence of television and magazines." Shelby
Miller wrote. "Now they do, and some are offended."
Many of the people who have worked with Save and others in the
charitable community have been offended as well. Sally Franz,
who formerly did fundraising for Save, was sitting in her office
one day in early 1994 when a colleague rushed in to show her
the new Save the Children ad from their new advertising agency.
The headline read, Help Stop a Different Kind of Child Abuse.
It was printed across the bottom of a photograph a dying and
abandoned Sudanese child being observed by a patient and healthy
looking vulture. The ad copy continued: "This abuse is merciless.
It preys on innocent, fragile lives and brutalizes them with
utter poverty...with constant hunger...with relentless diseases...with
no hope for even a basic education." Franz looked at the
ad and was horrified, not at the photograph but at Save the Children
for using it to raise money. To her and other people in the organization
the irony wasn't very subtle; it was Save the Children that was
merciless, preying on innocent, fragile lives.
Franz recalls that one of her African colleagues was particularly
upset by it. Franz and her colleague agreed, "The message
of all our advertising at Save was that Africans are too stupid
and ignorant to take care of themselves. And if we don't do it,
their parents and their government aren't responsible enough
to do it."
In addition, Save wasn't even working in Sudan where the photograph
was shot. And even if they had been working in Sudan they wouldn't
have been providing famine relief. This was a famine caused by
war, nothing that a small Save the Children community development
projects was going to address in the least. No amount of money
donated to Save was going to help that child or the thousands
of others in the region.
As word spread around the organization, Franz recalls, most of
the staffers joined her with the same overwhelmingly negative
reaction. MacCormack and the executives, however, were proud
of it. "They were very proud of it because they said it
was gonna get a great response and it was hard hitting, "
Franz says.
The ad also managed to annoy the community of relief organizations,
not exactly known themselves for their sensitive portrayal of
Africans and other dark-skinned people. Jerry Michaud the Executive
Director of the End Hunger Network, wrote to MacCormack. calling
the ad a "cheap shot." and described it as "hunger
porn." "At first I thought it was a Feed the Children
ad," Michaud wrote, referring to the Oklahoma City-based
organization that is universally despised for their lack of ethics
in the charity world.
Michaud wrote that it reminded him of an angry African delegate
to a conference who said: " The more desperate our conditions
are portrayed in the U.S. media, the more money you American
organizations seem to raise for your own overhead and projects."
The delegate could have continued and said that the more desperate
Africa seems the less likely it is to get investment and the
assistance it really needs to develop.
Michaud also wrote a letter to InterAction, a consortium of voluntary
organizations working in relief and development complaining that
the ad violated the "minimum standards for fundraising solicitations."
Soon after the first Save the Children ads appeared, the photographer
Kevin Carter was awarded a Pulitzer prize for his photograph.
Save's executives felt exonerated. They called a staff meeting
to gloat. "They just thought that was so sharp of them that
they picked out this Pulitzer Prize winning photo," Franz
recalls.
One of the executives stood up and said, "Just goes to show
ya, you just have to go ahead even when you have criticism."
They also announced that there had been a ten percent increase
in phone calls to Save's 800 number since the ad had run "Nobody
talked about the fact that a 10 percent increase in calls didn't
mean they were all positive calls. And nobody ever showed me
figures that those calls equaled money," Franz said. (Four
months after he won the Pulitzer, photographer Kevin Carter committed
suicide. Save continues to use his photograph in its ads.)
Save the Children has had some other irritating public relations
problems in the past: In the Spring of 1985 a young student in
a public school in the small town of Hughes, Arkansas came home
from school and dropped his knapsack on the floor. Later as his
mother was going through the boy's belongings she found a photograph
of a man and a woman and a letter addressed to her son. The letter
said that the man lived in New Hampshire and hoped someday to
come to Arkansas and see the boy and his family.
The boy's parents went to the school and then they went to an
attorney. Together they learned that the couple in the photograph
were Save the Children sponsors paying $16 a month (the fee at
that time) for the support of their child. Not only did they
not know their child was being sponsored, they weren't particularly
needy. It was soon revealed that around 100 students in the town
had been enrolled in the program without the knowledge of their
parents.
In October of 1985 parents of 21 children filed a $21 million
lawsuit, against Save the Children, the county director and six
public school teachers, alleging that Save had used their children
in advertising campaigns without their permission. According
to the suit, the teachers obtained permission to photograph the
children and collect biographical information on them "deceitfully
and without the consent or knowledge of the students' parents
or legal guardians." The suit charged the teachers were
paid $1 for each completed application and photograph. In addition,
publication of the photographs and biographical information by
Save the Children subjected the families "to ridicule, embarrassment
and shame in the community as impoverished and oppressed individuals."
The suit was settled for what was described by one attorney as
"a substantial sum" and the records were sealed.
Then, in April of 1986, Forbes Magazine published an article
revealing that Save wasn't exactly hand-carrying donated money
to recipient children and that funds were instead being pooled
into community development projects. Though the organization
had stopped the check-to-child programs five years earlier, their
advertising continued to give the impression that your child
got your money.
Save tried to make it all sound like a misunderstanding, but
in reality the deception was quite deliberate. Forbes reported:
"SCF staffers find such revelations particularly embarrassing.
`Many have asked that the ads be more representative of what
we're actually doing,' says one field director. `We even recommended
that we get away from child sponsorship and just sponsor communities.
But headquarters doesn't address our questions.'"
The Forbes article led to an NBC television investigation by
Connie Chung's short-lived magazine program, and the subsequent
firing of on employee who spoke with NBC. Then, in September
1986, in response to a threatened law suit from the attorney
general of the State of Connecticut, Save the Children agreed
to follow new guidelines in advertising in which they would state
clearly that sponsors' donations were pooled. (Even though the
ads all contain that line today, callers to Save's toll-free
numbers are immediately asked if they want to sponsor a boy or
a girl, and in which country. The impression still lingers that
"your" child is receiving your gifts.) Shelby Miller
pointed this out in her report: "There continues to be some
lack of understanding among sponsored children and their families
that the funds raised through sponsorship are pooled for community
programs. This has been confounded by the following facts: that
there have been no activities in some communities, that some
sponsors send checks and gifts directly to the child, and that
the information given to both sponsors and sponsored children's
families is not entirely clear. The sponsor is still `sold' the
concept on the basis of an individual child."
In 1992, as the staff uprising against president James Bausch
went into full swing, the Washington Post began an investigation.
But Bausch and Board chairman Dana Ackerly resigned before the
article was published. The story was killed as the new chairman
Najeeb Halaby, former director of the FAA and president of PanAm,
ascended to the chairmanship.
In all three of these cases Save went on a global media alert.
Chris Cassidy, who was in a small town in Somalia, remembers
a meeting that was called in Mogadishu in 1986 to warn of Connie
Chung's investigation. "When I started asking for details
about the charges against Save, I was told to shut up and be
a good soldier," Cassidy recalls.
Many Save staff members have been gotten the impression that
the organization devotes more energy to repairing its image in
the press than it does addressing the concerns that have been
raised. One of those most bewildered by the organization's strategy
was former board member Michael Dorris. On July 22, as the organization
was expecting the Post article to appear, he wrote to board chairman
Dana Ackerly, "We should take responsibility for `news'
about Save the Children, especially if it is potentially damaging,
thereby defusing any impression of our being reluctantly `exposed'...If
we've made mistakes, let us admit them and go forward..."
Dorris was also miffed because he had been asked by Save the
Children to talk with the Post reporter, writer-to-writer, to
see about getting the story killed.
Three days later Dorris wrote to the board, protesting the confidential
severance package that had been approved for James Bausch. The
$225,000 settlement had been approved because Save wanted to
avoid the publicity of a potential lawsuit from Bausch, who had
grounds to sue for breach of contract. "Having recently
seen first-hand the situation in Zimbabwe," Dorris wrote,
"I cannot in good faith agree that it's better to avoid
embarrassment or the threat of litigation than to pay for the
digging of 9000 new wells in a country on the verge of fatal
thirst." He said that Save "must be scrupulously honest
and forthcoming with financial information; to that end, I urge
that a full disclosure of any settlement terms be made public."
Dorris's advice wasn't taken, and on August 13 he resigned from
the board, citing "the non-acknowledgment of past errors
of judgment, to a general wariness toward legitimate outside,
objective scrutiny of our operation." Dorris also wrote
that he was disturbed by "the fact that my mailings from
Westport have contained far more information about procedures
(i.e., who one may or may not talk to) than the content of our
programs."
Save the Children did not take Dorris's advice. Instead they
called James Lukaszewski, a corporate public relations commando
who is called upon by companies expecting bad publicity over
chemical spills, hazardous-substance exposure, faulty and dangerous
products or nasty labor problems. Lukaszewski, whose high-priced
consulting firm is based in White Plains, New York, met with
Save the Children executives on September 2, 1992 to discuss
the Post investigation. Among the materials Lukaszewski was given
were the three letters from Dorris.
In his resignation letter, Dorris mentions one other problem
he had with Save the Children: "the amount of time and money
we have spent in litigation against Feed the Children."
In 1986, Save sued Feed the Children for trademark infringement.
The name of the newer organization was too close and likely to
cause confusion. That suit is due for a settlement any time now,
but Save has spent between $300-$500,000 a year of sponsorship
funds pursuing it.
It was through this maelstrom that Charles MacCormack ascended
to Save's presidency in 1992 with the clear intention of making
changes. His visits to Christian Children's Fund and other organizations
were meant to chart a program for the future, and to learn from
the "best practices" of other organizations.
CCF, MacCormack noted in his March 15, 1993 memo to the files,
was a much more efficient organization than Save. "They
have very lean headquarters staffing. Their entire fundraising
staff, producing over $100 million in private funding, is seven.
This compares with 36 fundraising and public relations employees
at Save the Children (58 if one counts the sponsor servers and
sponsor fulfillment employees)."
The memo also reflects an understanding that Save the Children
was in danger of being left behind in the fast-changing world
of development charities, where organizations were becoming more
professional, businesslike, and streamlined: "Paul McCleary,
the CEO of Christian Children's Fund, envisages that, in the
next century there will be a handful of major worldwide relief
and development organizations. These organizations will be looked
to by government and international organizations because of their
professionalism and their worldwide outreach. He considers CARE,
Catholic Relief Services and World Vision to have already reached
their critical mass. He intends that Christian Children's fund
will be in this key group.
MacCormack concluded: "It seems clear that our own sponsorship
strategy is flawed from beginning to end. We have to make sure
that sponsored children, families and communities have a real
stake in the success of our program. As a quid pro quo, we have
to make sure that these groups take on much more of the responsibility
for administering the sponsorship program at the field level.
As a result of this, we can reduce our field office staffing.
Finally, we must invest in the systems and the customer service
people to make sure that our sponsors know that we are meeting
their needs."
MacCormack's conclusion is probably the only one the administrator
of a sponsorship agency could reach. Given a choice of how to
spend limited resources, the needs of the sponsors must come
before the needs of the children. The survival of the organization
depends on it. Fewer staff will work in the field. More staff
will be in Westport to keep the sponsors happy. Save will become
a much more efficient fund-raising machine. But one, as Shelby
Miller said, built on the backs of children.
"There is no one on the staff of Save the Children who is
an expert in the field of early childhood development,"
Miller said. "There is no one there who knows what it will
take and has been willing to make the commitment necessary to
go out there and make a difference." Again, Miller became
angry. "Who's getting served here?" she asked. "It's
the sponsors."
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