December 26, 1989

PRESERVING AMERICAN SECURITY TIES TO SOMALIA

Michael Johns, Policy Analyst

INTRODUCTION

Trouble is looming in Somalia, the Horn of Africa's eastern-most country, as
political support for its regime appears to be eroding. This is creating
problems for the United States.

Though the Somali government of President Mohammed Siad Barre was once a
Soviet client, since 1977 it has been one of America's few allies in the region.
Somalia granted the U.S. access to Somali military bases and has served as a
balance to Soviet military involvement in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula.

Rebel Gains. Though Siad still enjoys strong political support from much of
his native Marehan ethnic clan, based in south-central Somalia, his popularity
outside these areas has diminished greaty. The Ethiopian-supported Somali
National Movement (SNM) rebels, who have fought the Siad government since 1982,
reportedly have taken substantial control of the country's northern territories
with the exception of Hargesia, the regional capital, and four garrison towns.
But early this month even Hargesia came under rebel attack. n1 And last month
the rebels claim to have captured Galcaio, a town in central Somalia. Even in
the capital, Mogadishu, support for Siad is diminishing. The Hawieh clan, the
largest in Mogadishu, recently formed an opposition political movement, the
Somali Union Congress.

n1 Robert Dowden, "Somalia is disintegrating into anarchy," The Independent(England), October 10, 1989, p. 10; and Agence France-Presse, "IntensiveOffensive Reported," December 7, 1989, Foreign Broadcast Information Service(FBIS).

Siad is also losing stature in the international community because of his
regime's alleged human rights abuses. A U.S. State Department report this
August charges that the Somali Armed Forces "appears to have engaged in a
widespread, systematic and extremely violent assault" on unarmed civilians, and
a September 1988 Amnesty International report contains similar changes. n2
Additionally, Siad's advancing age (he is believed to be over 80) and
questionable health have led even his trusted inner circle of advisors openly to
discuss a change of leadership.

n2 Robert Gersony, Why Somalis Flee: Synthesis of Accounts of ConflictExperience in Northern Somali Refugees, Displaced Person and Others, Bureau forRefugee Programs, Department of State, August 1989, p. 60. and Somalia: ALong-term Human Rights Crisis (New York: Amnesty International, September 1988).

Critical Bases. Siad's political weakness presents a dilemma for Washington
not only in the Horn of Africa, but also in the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and
Persian Gulf. Siad grants American warplanes landing rights at airports and
American warships use of port facilities at Berbera, a northern Somali port town
on the Gulf of Aden, and at Mogadishu, the country's capital, which borders the
Indian Ocean.

Access to these facilities have played an important role since 1980 in
American military plans to respond to crises in the Middle East, Southwest Asia,
and Sub-Saharan Africa. The airstrip at Berbera, constructed by the Soviets in
1976, is over three miles long, making it among Africa's longest. During the
Iran hostage crisis in 1979, Jimmy Carter viewed the Somali bases as one of the
few potential launching points for American forces attempting to rescue the
American hostages in Tehran. The facilities also counter the Soviet air and
naval facilities in Ethopia, South Yemen, the Socotra island off the South Yemen
coast, and on the Dahlak Archipelago off the Red Sea coast of Ethiopia.

The loss of American access to Berbera and Mogadishu would diminish greatly
U.S. access to the region, and tilt the regional power balance substantially in
favor of the Soviet Union.

Shopping the Globe. To make matters worse, relations between Washington and
Mogadishu are at the lowest point in Siad's 20-year reign. To hold back the
rebels, Siad needs outside military assistance. But American military aid,
which amounted to $7.5 million in 1987, was suspended in July 1988 because of
Somalia's poor human rights record. This has forced the Somali leader to shop
the globe for military equipment, even, it seems, requesting assistance from
Libya and the Soviet Union. Also because of human rights abuses, the U.S.
cancelled a proposed military exercise with Somalia, called "Bright Star,"
scheduled to have taken place last month.

As it has turned out, Washington's decision to trim its strategic and
military cooperation with the Somali government has done nothing to improve
human rights in Somalia. As recently as July, Somali troops reportedly opened
fire on demonstrators in Mogadishu, killing dozens. n3 With the government
facing an arms shortage, the SNM has been able to attack areas in Somalia
previously at peace, thus endangering political stability in the nation and
forcing the government into a state of desperation. Human rights continue to be
violated and peace appears to be further away than ever. America's policy of
suspending strategic and military cooperation with Somalia, therefore, has
failed to achieve its objectives.

n3 The Human rights group, Africa Watch, estimated that as many as 450 peoplewere killed in this fighting, but government estimates were that the fatalitiesdid not exceed 23. Jane Perlez, "Report for U.S. Says Somali Army Killed 5,000Unarmed Civilians," The New York Times, September 9, 1989, p. 5.

Countering Moscow. Because the Soviets are deeply entrenched militarily in
the Horn of Africa, the U.S. needs some military presence to counter them.
Somalia is one of the few appropriate locations for this. If Siad falls,
however, a new regime could deny American access to the Somali facilities. To
prevent this, Washington should modify its policy of disengaging entirely from
Somalia. The Bush Administration should work to ensure that Somalia does not
fall into hostile hands and prod Siad to improve his human rights record and to
move toward free elections.

To achieve these objectives, the U.S. should:

¥Revive the military assistance program with Somalia.

¥ Urge the Somali government to upgrade security at the military facilities
in Berbera and Mogadishu to defend them from attacks from the Somali National
Movement and other insurgents.

¥Extend the access agreement, first signed in 1980, to the Berbera and
Mogadishi facilites when it comes up for renewal in 1990.

¥Promote reconciliation talks between the Somali government and the Somali
National Movement, the United Somali Congress, and other opposition groups.

¥ Open contact with the Somali opposition to encourage them to accept a
cease fire and initiate talks with the government.

¥Demand that Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam cease his military
support for the Somali insurgents.

FROM COLONIALISM TO INDEPEDENCE

Located in eastern Africa, Somalia's coastline borders the Indian Ocean and
the Gulf of Aden. Before achieving independence in 1960, Somalia was a colony
of both Britian and Italy, each of which controlled separate regions of the
country. Britain controlled what was called British Somaliland, now northern
Somalia; Italy controlled what was called Italian Somaliland, now southern
Somalia. British-controlled areas remained under London's rule from 1886 until
June 1940, when Italian troops, following their declaration of war on Britain,
overran British garrisons. As part of its military operations against the
Italian East African Empire in 1941, Britain captured all of Somalia. The
United Nations General Assembly ruled in November 1949 that Italian Somaliland
should be placed under an international trusteeship for ten years, with Italy as
the administering authority. Following the ten-year trusteeship, Italian
Somaliland was to be granted independence.

Britain, meanwhile, took steps to prepare for independence of British
Somaliland. Legislative assembly elections were held in British Somaliland in
February 1960, and the new legislature on April 6, 1960 called unanimously for
independence from Britain and declared its intention to unite the independent
Italian Somaliland. British Somaliland was granted independence on June 26,
1960, and five days later, it joined Italian Somaliland to form an independent
nation, the Somali Republic.

MODERN SOMALIA

Somalia borders the African nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. With
its Horn of Africa location, Somalia is Africa's gateway to the Gulf of Aden and
the Arabian Peninsula. As such, Somalia has been one of the few African nations
whose trade and travel contact with the Arabian peninsula dates back centuries.
Somalia is a member of the Arab League and (with almost all of its citizens
professed Muslims) the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), two
international organizations dominated predominately by Middle Eastern nations.
It is also, understandably, a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Somalia's 5.4 million people inhabit a nation about the size of California,
making it one of the more sparesly populated nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
country lacks modern transportation and communication networks, which has
discouraged foreign investment. There is no rail system, and a large portion of
the country lacks phone service.

Ethnic Tensions. Unique for Africa, Somalia is composed of only one ethnic
group, the Somalis, that share a common language (Somali) and religion (Muslim).
They are divided into six major clans, the Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawieh, Ishaak,
and Rahanwein, that have traditionally been rivals. With the independence of
Somalia, these tribe-like clans were forced to govern and live side by side,
causing ethnic tension.

Like its Horn of Africa neighbors, especially Ethiopia and Sudan, Somalia is
extremely poor. It lacks many of the natural resources, such as copper,
diamonds, gold, and manganese, found in abundance elsewhere in Africa. Its work
force is largely unskilled, working almost exclusively in agriculture, fishing,
and livestock. Though petroleum exploration has been undertaken, the results
have been disappointing. Sound economic statistics are hard to come by in
Somalia. The U.S. Department of Commerce's most recent analysis of the Somali
economy reports that for 1987 gross domestic product per capita was $267
(compared, for example, to $368 to Kenya, $950 for Nigeria, and $1,739 for
Mexico). In 1988, Somalia exported $1.4 million worth of products to the U.S.,
mainly soybeans, corn oil, wheat, and corn meal. The U.S. exported $27.1
million worth of products to Somalia, mainly instruments, appliances, and food
products. n4

n4 "Foreign Economic Trends and The Implications for the United States," U.S.Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, prepared by U.S.Embassy Mogadishu, August 1988, p. 2; also, U.S. Department of Commerce sources.

Nationlist Parties. Somalia adopted its first national constitution in June
1961, providing for a European-style parliamentary democracy. Political parties
were numerous and based on the different clans. The most prominent were the
Somali National League, the United Somali Party, and the Somali Youth League.
Though nationalist sentiments were strong, tension developed between the clans
in the northern and southern territories. Political divisions also developed
between those nationalist parties such as the Somali Youth League that wanted to
bring territories in Ethiopia and Kenya inhabited by ethnic Somalis, under one
unified Somali state, and the so-called "modernists," represented by the Somali
National Congress, a coalition of former members of the Somali National League
and the Somali Youth League, who were more concerned with economic modernization
and improving relations with other African nations. n5

n5 "Background Notes: Somalia," U.S. Department of State, April 1986, p. 4.

One Somali political party, the Somali Youth League (SYL), won enough support
from the diverse clans to assume political power in Somalia in 1967. The SYL's
party leader, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, was elected prime minister in 1967. He
maintained Somalia's democratic political structure and worked to foster closer
relations with neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya.

Socialist Regime. Egal's rule lasted only two years. Constitutional
democracy ended in October 1969 when Somalia's army and police, led by Major
General Mohamed Siad Barre,. overthrew the government in a bloodless coup. The
new regime governed through a 20-member Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)
with Siad as chairman. And in an apparent effort to obtain military and political
support from Moscow, Siad announced in October 1970 that he was a socialist.

The U.S. was strongly allied at the time with Emperor Haile Selassie's
government in neighboring Ethiopia, and Siad's rise to power offered the Soviets
an opportunity for greater influence in the Horn of Africa. The Soviets
embraced Siad and signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Somalia in
1974. In the three following years, the Soviet Union sent an estimated $435
million in military support to Somalia.

In the mid-1970s, Siad began training a rebel movement in the Ogaden region
of eastern Ethiopia called the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). The
Ogaden, which is populated predominately by ethnic Somalis, was viewed by Siad
as part of a greater Somalia. Siad hoped that by formenting unrest in the
Ogaden, he could someday detach it from Ethiopia and annex it to Somalia.

Strategic Prize. Siad ordered his forces to invade the Ogaden region in July
1977 to support the WSLF in their fight against Ethiopia. The same month,
however, in a startling reversal of policy, the Soviet Union withdrew its
support of Siad and began sending military assistance to Ethiopia's new leader,
Mengistu Haile Mariam, who took power following a two and a half year struggle
with the coalition that had toppled Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974.
This dramatic shift in Soviet policy was due in part to Moscow's calculation
that it could take advantage of the increasingly tense relations between
Washington and Mengistu, spurred primarily by Mengistu's human rights
violations. Another reason for the switch was Mengistu's more sincere
ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism.

Perhaps most important, in the choice between aligning with Ethiopia or
Somalia, the Soviets simply viewed Ethiopia as the greater strategic prize -- as
it surely is. Soviet military presence in Ethiopia gave Moscow access to the
Red Sea at ports only 200 miles from oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The Soviets also
inherited existing American military facilities, like the communications center
in Asmara, near the Red Sea. n6 Since 1977, Moscow clearly has valued its
strategic alliance with Mengistu, sending Ethiopia some $7 billion of military
assistance.

n6 For a fuller discussion of Ethiopia's strategic value, see Michael Johns,
"A U.S. Strategy to Foster Human Rights in Ethiopia," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 692. February 23, 1989.

Breaking With Cuba. Following Moscow's embrace of Mengistu, Siad expelled
all Soviet advisers in November 1977 and abrogated the friendship agreement with
the Soviet Union. That month, too, because of Cuba's extensive involvement in
the Ogaden War, Siad also broke diplomatic ties with Cuba. n7 Without Soviet
military backing, Somalia's forces were forced to retreat from the Ogaden in
March 1978, though the WSLF continues to carry out guerrilla activity in the
region to this day.

n7 Cuba's Fidel Castro sent some 22,000 troops to the Ogaden to assistEthiopia in its fight against Somalia. Diplomatic relations between Cuba andSomalia were just reestablished this year.

THE U.S. AND SOMALIA

Upon breaking with Moscow in 1977, Siad turned to the U.S. for military
assistance, though the U.S. was initially reluctant to help him because of his
support for the Ogaden insurgents in Ethiopia. Eventally, however, the U.S.
became convinced of the need to counter Soviet involvement in the region, and
responded favorably to Siad's request for closer relations.

As a result, the U.S. opened an Agency for International Development (AID)
office in Somalia in 1978. Current AID programs include a livestock quarantine
station designed to breed healthy cattle, management training programs and
health services. AID also provides the Somali government with advice on expoert
competiveness. The U.S. has provided Somalia with $300 million in economic
assistance since 1985, most of which has been used for economic development,
food aid, and management training programs.

U.S. Military Aid. The U.S. in August 1980 signed an agreement with Siad
giving the U.S. access to airfields and dock facilities in Berbera and
Mogadishu. The same year the U.S. began providing Somalia with military
assistance. Since then, the U.S. has given Somalia $133.5 million in such aid,
in addition to military training. U.S. lethal military aid to Somalia has been
mainly rifles and other small weapons. When Ethiopia forces invaded Somalia in
summer 1982, the U.S. airlifted military supplies to help Somalia defend its
territory.

Relations between Washington and Magadishu were close from 1982 until last
year, though military aid for Somalia was cut from around $25 million a year to
$5 million a year in 1987 because of across-the-board reductions in the
Pentagon's African military assistance budget. Siad visited the U.S. in 1982.
Along with Zaire, Somalia has been viewed widely as one of the U.S.'s closest
allies in Africa.

As reports of significant human rights violations by the Siad regime reached
the West, the U.S. suspended its lethal military aid for Somalia in July 1988,
and $21 million in economic assistance was redirected to other African countries
this August. Another reason for the suspension was U.S. unhappiness with Siad's
refusal to talk with the SNM rebels. Siad since has expressed willingness to
talk unconditionally with the SMN, has released most political prisoners, and
has appointed a commission to provide recommendations on a return to democracy,
but the U.S. ban on military aid to Somalia has not been lifted.

Staying Engaged. As a result, U.S. policy toward Somalia is in limbo. There
is significant congressional opposition to reactivating U.S. military and
economic assistance to Somalia, though both the Pentagon and State Department
reportedly have expressed support for renewed assistance. "We don't want to
give a signal of withdrawal," a State Department spokesman commented in October
1988. "We want to stay engaged." n8 Earlier this month, the U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for East Africa Irvin Hicks visited Mogadishu for
talks with top Somali officials. He reportedly praised Siad's recent decision
to explore the possibility for a multi-party system in Somalia, but made no
announcement about restoring U.S. economic or military assistance. n9
n8 David Ottaway, "Congress Blocking Aid to Somalia,"The Washington Post,
October 26, 1988, p. A20.

n9 Mogadishu Domestic Service, December 14, 1989, Foreign BroadcastInformation Service, December 7, 1989.

Congressional opposition to aid to Somalia has been led by Democratic
Representatives Howard Wolpe of Michigan and William H. Gray, III, of
Pennsylvania. This September, Gray introduced a Sense of the Congress
Resolution that insisted upon "significant improvements in the area of human
rights as a precondition to the resumption of foreign assistance to Somalia."
n10

n10 Congressman William H. Gray, III, letter to congressional colleagues,September 25, 1989.

SOMALIA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Somalia-U.S. trade relations are very limited, and Somalia possesses few
natural resources required by the U.S. The U.S. interest in Somalia is limited
almost exclusively to the African country's strategic value: its location along
the coastline to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, two strategically
important waterways.

The Somali coastline is the second largest on the African continent after
South Africa. An estimated 500,000 barrels of crude oil passes through the Gulf
of Aden each day, much of it destined for Europe, North America, and American
allies in Asia. n11 Given the volatile nature of the region, created by such
unpredictable countries as Ethiopia and Iran, as well as the Soviet Union's deep
military involvement, it is necessary for the U.S. to maintain naval and air
power in the region. The Soviets have built a major military facility in the
Dahlak Islands in the Red Sea, and have air and naval bases on the southern tip
of the Arabian Peninsula at Aden and on the Yemeni Island of Socotra in the Gulf
of Aden. These facilities enable the Soviets to dock and refuel ships, fly
reconnaissance flights in the region, and to project air and naval power in the
Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.

n11 Petroleum Economist, October 1989, p. 325; and Department of Energysources

.

Renewing the Bases Agreements. The bases in Somalia allow the U.S. to
counter Soviet military power in the region. In accord with the 1980 access
agreement, the U.S. can operate Navy flights out of the air strips at Berbera
and Mogadishu, conduct joint exercises with Somali forces, dock and refuel
ships, and conduct military repairs. The air strips at Berbera and Mogadishu
enable the U.S. to fly reconnaissance flights in the region, and could be used
for combat air operations in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, or the Indian Ocean.
Berbera said Mogadishu also are used for military training exercises in the
region. The option for discontinuing the agreement comes up next year, but the
Siad government has said it wants to renew it.

Political instability in Somalia, however, could make renewals uncertain.
Siad is at war with the Ethiopian-backed Somali National Movement. Given the
SNM's close ties with Soviet-backed Ethiopia, its victory over the government
potentially could end U.S. access to the Berbera and Mogadishu facilities.
Such a development could lead to not only greater instability in the Horn of
Africa, but also to the expansion of Soviet military power into Somalia.

SIAD'S RULE

Major General Mohamed Siad Barre has ruled Somalia with an iron hand since
taking power in October 1969. He has permitted little dissent and at times has
crushed such dissent with force. Though his rule has been authoritarian,
Somalia's human rights record, while heavily criticized, has been much better
than that of Mengistu Haile Mariam in neighboring Ethiopia. Over one million
Ethiopians have died, primarily as a result of atrocities committed by
Mengistu's government and by the man-made famine created by Mengistu in 1984 in
an effort to crush areas of political opposition. n12 Unlike many dictators,
Siad recently permitted human rights investigators from Amnesty International,
the Department of State, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and other
institutions to visit Somalia and investigate the country's human rights
conditions.

n12 See Johns, "A U.S. Strategy for Foster Human Rights in Ethiopia," op.cit. Also, Michael Johns, "Gorbachev's Holocaust: Soviet Complicity inEthiopia's Famine,"Policy Review, Summer 1988, p. 74.

Findings by these human rights organizations over the past year, however,
have revealed significant human rights violations under the Siad regime. These
conditions are widely reported to have deteriorated since May 1988 when the
Somali National Movement (SNM) launched it largest offensive to date against the
Siad regime. A September 1988 Amnesty International report found that Somalia
had engaged in "a consistent pattern of torture, lengthy and often arbitrary
detention of suspected political opponents of the government and often unfair
trials of political defendants." n13 Amnesty International is planning a
follow-up report on Somalia's human rights condition.

n13 Somalia: A Long-term Human Rights Crisis, op. cit., p. 1.

Room for Miscalculation. Another human rights report by Robert Gersony, a
consultant for the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs, concluded
this August that the Somali government was responsible for the murder of "at
least 5,000" unarmed civilians who belonged the Issak clan. n14 The Gersony
report must be viewed skeptically, however, because it relies on interviews with
Somali refugees and displaced persons, which leaves room for miscalculation.
Gersony's 1988 human rights report on civilian murders by the Mozambique
National Resistance (RENAMO) was done in a similar fashion, prompting
condemnations of the report's methodology. n15

n14 Gersony, op. cit., p. 61. n15 See, for instance, William Pascow, "The Controversial State DepartmentReport on Mozambique," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Update, No. 75, May 4,1988.

Nonetheless, the number of accusations against Siad, coming from diverse
sources, leave little doubt that a very serious human rights problem exists in
Somalia. But such abuses are not restricted to the governments. Somalia's
major armed rebel movement, the Somali National Movement, also has been
criticized for violating human rights. According to Gersony: "During the
first three months of its 1988 offensive in northern Somalia, SNM combatants
killed unarmed civilians in individual instances which together may have
resulted in the deaths of at last several hundred or more persons . . . .
During its presence in Burao (in northern Somalia), the SNM conducted summary
executions of fifty or more prisoners, some after perfunctory court martials."
n16 The fierce tactics of both the government and the SNM in northern Somalia
have forced some 400,000 Somalis to seek refuge in Ethiopia.

n16 Gersony, op. cit., p. 62.

Positive Steps. Human rights accusations have not been the only charges
leveled against Siad. Many Somalis contend that Siad has granted special
privileges to members of his native Marehan clan. Government positions and
trade licenses reportedly often have been granted first to Marehans, which has
been enormously frustrating to other Somali clans, especially the Issaqs. This
practice has intensified ethnic-based tensions.

In the past year, however, Siad has taken positive steps. In February, an
estimated 100 political prisoners were released and last month a commission was
appointed to prepare constitutional amendments that will allow a multiparty
political system. Siad has also remarked recently that elections could be held
as early as next year. n17

n17 "Siad Barre Says Free Elections Planned for 1990,"Agence France-Presse,November 12, 1989, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, November 13, 1989, p.3.

U.S. POLICEY TOWARD SOMALIA

Washington now faces a challenge in Somalia. Siad is an aging dictator with
diminishing support among his people, and his departure from power is widely
believed to be imminent. The Bush Administration must anticipate Siad's
departure and prepare for relations with his successor. In doing so, the
Administration should have two main objectives: 1) continued American access to
Somali airfield and seaport facilities in Berbera and Mogadishu; and 2) a
peaceful transfer of political power in Somalia that will, among other things,
improve the human rights condition.

In pursuit of these objectives, the U.S. should:

** Revive the military assistance program with Somalia. Denying Somalia the
military aid it needs to defend itself against a foreign-supported insurgency
and an aggressive Soviet-Supported neighbor, Ethiopia, does not improve
Somalia's domestic human rights climate and may aggravate the situation by
creating a sense of desperation among the Somali armed forces. Such a policy
also could push Siad into such hostile hands as Libya and the Soviet Union. The
U.S. should revive its military assistance to Somalia, providing it with
defensive-oriented military aid for use against rebel advances, while urging the
Siad government to open peace talks with the rebels designed to reach political
reconciliation and democracy.

** Upgrade security at American military facilities in Somalia. As the civil
war in Somalia rages, chances increase that the Somali National Movement (SNM)
or other armed insurgents may attack American facilities. The SNM is already
fighting in Berbera. The U.S. should ensure that these Somali facilities are
properly defended by upgrading their security. Because the bases are not owned
by the U.S., this will require close cooperation with Somalia.

** Renew the U.S.-Soviet access agreement to the Berbera and Mogadishu
facilities when it comes up for review in 1990. The airport and seaport
facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu respectively offer U.S. forces access to the
Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. Given the volatile nature of
this region, it is critical that the U.S. maintain such access to defend U.S.
security interests. The access agreement with Somalia enables the U.S. to fly
Navy flights out of the air strips, conduct joint exercises with Somali forces,
dock and refuel ships, and conduct military repairs.

** Open talks with Somalia's opposition. To foster reconciliation between
the government of Somalia and the Somali opposition groups, the Bush
Administration should establish diplomatic contact with the Somali National
Movement (SNM) and other opposition groups. The SNM refuses to talk with the
Somali government until Siad leaves power. The U.S. should urge the SNM to
change this policy.

** Demand that Ethiopia's Mengistu not destabilize Somalia. Ethiopian
dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam is providing arms, trucks, fuel and other
military assistance to the Somali National Movement. This aid, in part, has
been used to attack Ethiopian refugee camps in Somalia, resulting in civilian
fatalities. SNM forces, for instance, attacked two refugee camps in Agabar and
Las Dhure, killing an estimated 43 people in May 1988. n18 The U.S. should
inform the Ethiopian leader that unless he ends his destabilizing role in
Somalia, the U.S. will terminate all diplomatic contact with Ethiopia.

n18 For a fuller discussion of human rights violations by the Somali NationalMovement (SNM), see Gersony,op. cit., pp. 40-42, pp. 51-52, and p. 62.

** Link further U.S. economic assistance to Somalia to improvements in the
country's human rights record and to progress toward democracy. Instead of
terminating military assistance to Somalia over human rights violations, which
will endanger U.S. security interests and potentially push the Somali government
into the hands of hostile nations, the U.S. should offer Somalia increased
economic assistance as human rights improvements are made and steps are taken
toward democracy. Siad has already set up a commission to explore
constitutional options for a return to democracy, and the U.S. should encourage
this commission to present such a plan as quickly as possible. Once a new
constitution providing for a restoration of democracy in Somalia is agreed upon,
the U.S. immediately should restore the economic assistance program, which was
estimated at $21 million before Congress suspended it this August. The U.S.
should inform Siad that once free and fair elections are held in Somalia, the
U.S. will be prepared to double this assistance.

CONCLUSION

Somalia has been one of America's closest allies in Africa since 1977. This
useful relationship need not be sacrificed because of Siad's political weakness
and poor human rights record. Instead, Washington should use its limited
influence in Somalia to encourage political reconciliation between the warring
factions and to promote human rights improvements, while at the same time
safeguarding U.S. security interests in the region by ensuring continued access
to Somali air and naval facilities.

Constructive Force. Human rights have been violated systematically in
Somalia, but Siad has made modest progress in the past year. Political
prisioners have been released, commissions to explore steps toward
democratization have been appointed, and Siad has expressed interest in
restoring a multiparty system and opening negotiations with Somali opposition
groups. Washington's abandoning Somali will not improve human rights in
Somalia, but could only open the way for increased Soviet and Libyan influence.

Instead of disengaging from Somalia, the U.S. should work more closely with
Siad to democratize Somalia and respect human rights, while still safeguarding
U.S. security interests through a restoration of the military assistance program
and greater cooperation on protecting the security of the important base
facilities in Berbera and Mogadishu. As such, the U.S. can protect U.S.
security interests in the region while becoming a more constructive and
influential force in fostering a more humane and stable Somalia.
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Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views
of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any
bill before Congress.

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