In August this year I went to Mogadishu to start working on a segment for the American television show, 60 Minutes. The show was to be about "The American Warlord," a look at the situation in Somalia through a profile of Hussein Aydiid. In the news business this is what we call a "hook." The reality is that Americans don't care about foreign affairs and they really don't care much about Africa. To get them to watch a television show about Africa you need famine, elephants, gorillas or something that interests them. The fact that Hussein Aydiid is an American citizen, a former U.S. Marine was enough to get them interested. Using that "hook" we could then do a story about the situation in Mogadishu.
Americans, of course aren't interested in the same details as Somalis or people who care about Somalia. They need everything to be very simple. No names of clans, no complicated history, just good guys and bad guys. Of course the Somalia story is much more complicated than that. I'll try to convey some of what I learned.
The question on everybody's mind is this: Is Hussein Aydiid really in charge?
In charge of what? Somalia? Of course not.
In charge of Mogadishu? Definitely no.
In charge of his faction? In charge of what he calls his government? This is the real question. And again, the answer to that question is NO. He is not in charge as his father was in charge. Aydiid senior did what he wanted. He defied the elders and they still followed him. Young Aydiid has no such power, and his position is very precarious. I will try to explain the situation as I see it. Keep in mind that these observations are based only on my time in Mogadishu. On this trip I did not get out of the city at all. I did, however, have the opportunity to spend some time talking with Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Sheikh Ali Dheere, and Osman Ato & Mohamed Hassan Awale, as well as many people in the Aydiid camp.
The Aydiid Succession: How did Hussein Aydiid, a 34-year-old man with little experience in Somalia get to be "president"? When his father's faction formed their "government" in April of 1995 they said that they were no longer a faction, but the legitiamate government of Somalia representing all Somalis. They pointed out that their cabinet contained people from most of the clan groups in Somalia. Of course, no one really believed them, and this event led to the split of Aydiid's Sacad subclan. Osman Ato and his group begged Aydiid not to form a government. They argued that by forming a government they were destroying any chance of reconcilliation with the other Hawiye factions. Ato went to the Habr Gedir elders with his arguments and they agreed that Aydiid should not form a government. But Aydiid defied the elders, and the Sacad clan split between the Jalaf and Hilowle.
When Aydiid was killed in August 1996, the "presidency" should have passed to the vice president, Abdirahman "Tuur" if this was really a constitutional, legal government. But of course there was no way that Tuur or Ghalib or anyone else could ever hope to lead the Habr Gedir militias. Only someone from Aydiid's family could command that loyalty. Tuur was one of Hussein Aydiid's biggest supporters for the "presidency." By supporting Aydiid he acknowledged what everyone knew: The SNA was still a clan-based faction, and had never become a government of any kind.
There were also external reasons for appointing Aydiid as president. Faction leaders hoped that this man with his American passport and U.S. Marine background could help them win the support and recognition of the American government. Aydiid's envoys in Washington wrote to the State Department that they were pro-American and would stand up against Islamic fundamentalism, which they thought the Americans were worried about. They told the Americans that Ali Mahdi's faction with their sharia courts was under the control of Sheikh Ali Dheere; and they said that Al-Itihad had to be stopped in Gedo regions. And, finally, the Aydiid faction quietly approved of the Ethiopian invasion into Gedo region to strike at Al-Itihad. They also hired former U.S. Ambassador Frank Crigler to lobby on their behalf in Washington.
All of this is useless. The U.S. government will never under any circumstances recognize an Aydiid government unless there is a true national consensus. And the Americans aren't particularly concerned with Islamic fundamentalism one way or the other in Somalia. The Clinton administration would like nothing better than to never hear from Somalia again, since even the word "Somalia" reminds Clinton of his biggest failure. The Americans do not really perceive Al-Itihad as any threat and they are willing to allow Ethiopia and Kenya to deal with any problems associated with Islamic militancy. (One guy at the state department had never even heard of Al-Itihad.)
It was probably concern over the Islamic "threat" that prompted Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi to try to sponsor peace talks in Nairobi last month. Moi has his own big problems with growing Islamic nationalism within Kenya. (In addition, businessmen in Kenya are losing money to Somali traders. The Kenyans want peace in Somalia so they can send all the Somalis home.)
The reality is that the longer Somalia contunues without a government, the more people are turning to Islam as the only recognized authority. In Mogadishu the beneficiary of this is Sheikh Ali Dheere, whose iron-handed application of sharia has brought peace and security to north Mogadishu. He has succeeded where the faction leaders have failed.
The recent Nairobi peace talks failed because Hussein Aydiid insists that he will only negotiate as the president of Somalia. Under these circumstances, no one can seriously talk with him. Ali Mahdi Mohamed laughed out loud when we told him that Aydiid had invited him to join the government. "It's a joke" Ali Mahdi said.
Ali Mahdi has said that he himself will renounce his claim to the presidency of Somalia if Aydiid will join him in honest peace talks. But even if Aydiid wanted to renounce the presidency -- he can't. He doesn't have enough power yet to compromise. In politics it takes strength to back down. It is easier to compromise with your enemies than with your friends. If Hussein Aydiid wants to compromise he must first gain real power and the respect of his followers. He cannot appear to be weak (to compromise) until he is strong. And some of the people around Hussein can't allow him to compromise. If Aydiid steps back and says that he will accept to be only a clan leader, what happens to Jess, Qanyare, Tuur, Ghalib and the others? They will have nowhere to go. So these are the men behind Aydiid telling him `you are the president of all Somalia. You must not compromise. You are the president of all Somalia.'
And Hussein Aydiid belives them.
These Mogadishu faction leaders think they are fighting over the future of all Somalia. In reality they are only fighting over Mogadishu. The Aydiid faction tells journalists and other visitors that they control 70 percent of the country, and that the other faction leaders are bandits who will be brought into line soon. The reality is that they control only a small part of Mogadishu, Merca, Baidoa and some other towns. In Mogadishu Aydiid is surrounded by enemies. Ali Mahdi is still in the north. Ato and Musse Sudi control Medina and the former university area. The Afgooye road from K5 to the edge of town is called "Bosnia." It is deserted and dangerous as rival gunmen face each other across the road. Aydiid can't even drive to the airport at K-50 without being attacked.
Aydiid told me that because Abdirahman Tuur was with him it meant that the Isaaq were behind him. Because Omar Jess was with him, the Ogadeen were behind his government. He went on to explain that the Rahanwein are also joining his government . . . etc. I thought he was lying to me, then I realized that he believed what he was saying.
Hussein has no idea what is going on in Somalia. He has never walked out on the streets and talked to people. He has never seen most of the country. He only arrived back in Somalia from California in August, 1995. He has spent all of his time with his father and his father's people. He has heard only what they have told him. He is now surrounded by his father's advisors he tell him only what they want him to hear.
On the streets of Mogadishu people are wondering "who is this boy?" I spoke with many people who said they did not consider Aydiid their leader. When I asked people who they followed in Mogadishu, more people said Sheikh Ali Dheere.
The sheikh denies that he has political ambitions, but he is an intelligent man and an excellent politician. He knows the longer there is no peace in Mogadishu, the more powerful he becomes. His popularity has drained power from both Aydiid and Ali Mahdi.
Both faction leaders are also losing power to renegade groups on both sides of the old green line. Neither faction leader can send militias to some parts of the city center without starting a fight.
And while Mogadishu remains in chaos, the rest of the country is pulling away and forgetting about the city.
Siyaad Barre spent a lot of his time gathering power in Mogadishu, making the city the most important place in the country. Now Bosaasso, Kismayo, Luuq and other areas of the country are developing self-sufficiency. Because Mogadishu doesn't exist for them they are succeeding on their own. Somalia will develop without Mogadishu if the fighting there continues. One day if one of those faction leaders succeeds in controlling the city he will turn to the rest of the country and find that no one cares who is in control.
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