Joint Conference Church and Development / GKKE,
International Conference on Conflict Mediation and Consolidation
of Peace
Bonn, 31. March to 4. April 1995
The regional workshop divided into three parallel sessions on
the countries Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan on Saturday, April 1,
and on the morning of Sunday, April 2, 1995. The sessions of the
group on Somalia were chaired by Prof. Mohamed Mukhtar, Savannah
State College, Georgia/USA. Resource persons were Sture Normark
of the Life & Peace Institute in Uppsala/Sweden, Ambassador
Mohamed Sahnoun, former Special Representative of the UN-Secretary
General to Somalia and presently of the International Development
Research Center in Ottawa/Canada, Michel Gauthier, senior deputy
representative of the UN Development Programme in Somalia, and
Karl Weis, former head of the Diakonie/Caritas-Germany programme
in Somalia. The rapporteur was Kathrin Eikenberg, Institute of
African Affairs, Hamburg/Germany.
As several questions and issues were taken up during the sessions
in different contexts, the group report has been organised along
topics and issues rather than chronologically.
For those not familiar with the development of the conflict in
Somalia, a brief overview has been added as an annex.
On UNOSOM and lessons to be learnt:
A major criticism of the involvement of the UN in the conflict
in Somalia was that the UN came in too late; several prior opportunities
for a political intervention in the conflict had been missed.
Specifically mentioned were 1988, when full-scale war began in
the north of Somalia, May 1990, when more than a hundred traditional
and religious leaders, former political leaders and other respected
personalities published the "Manifesto", a sharp critique
of the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre and a proposal for working
towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and January 1991,
when Barre had left Mogadishu and factional fighting in Mogadishu
had not yet begun. This can partly be explained by the international
climate: With the end of the Cold War, the whole region had lost
much of its strategic value, and interest in the survival or otherwise
of the regime of Barre was consequently limited. Its final collapse
at the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991 coincided with the
Gulf war, which absorbed much of international attention. However,
a lesson to learnt from Somalia is that it costs much more, in
terms of suffering and death, but also in terms of resources needed
to help the victims, to let a conflict deteriorate to a point
where it becomes almost intractable and a solution very hard to
find, then an early political initiative would have cost. The
outcome of an earlier involvement would certainly have been different
from the eventual outcome of UNOSOM.
Once the UN had become involved, the pressure increased for a
quick solution, a "quick fix". Those advocating a "bottom-up
approach", attempting to involve traditional leaders, elders,
local communities, and step by step build up a peace process within
Somali society, were by and large overridden by this concern for
a quick fix. An aspect brought up as warranting a closer examination,
though not gone into in the group discussion, is the role of the
international media - that the military intervention of "Operation
Restore Hope" was undertaken had much to do with the media
coverage of the famine and of the difficulties encountered by
international NGOs trying to provide humanitarian aid. Another
lesson to be learnt from the case of Somalia is that a peace process
takes time and patience, that is has to be built up from the "grassroots"
in a continuous dialogue which has to include all the relevant
actors within the society.
An important point made in this regard was that the UN-Mission
and also other initiatives for mediation and conflict resolution
were directed at the military leaders or "warlords"
and the armed factions; there were, in fact, numerous well-intentioned
initiatives, the latest mentioned being undertaken by a delegation
from Ethiopia's Somali region, but all were based on the same
approach, concentrating on the military leaders and aimed at reaching
a written agreement. In retrospect, this was identified as a mistake.
Another point related to this was that these initiatives did not
take the socio-political reality of Somali society into account
(see also below). In general, there was insufficient knowledge
and understanding of the society and the conflict, not only on
the part of the UN. The US-led "Operation Restore Hope"
and the later military involvement of the USA was also based on
insufficient knowledge of the terrain.
That there was this lack of knowledge and understanding, was seen
as being connected with the frequent changes of UNOSOM staff,
starting from the SRSG - there were five different SRSG within
three years -; new staff were often not well prepared, there was
a lack of continuity. There was no structure within the UN-Mission
to carry a process of reconciliation and peace-building. A suggestion
in this regard was that it might have been useful if there had
been a small number of people with the asignment to follow this
process continuously.
A general criticism of UNOSOM was that there was no clear strategy
and that the UN was not consistent in its approach. An example
of this was the approach to the district councils which were being
formed following the agreement signed by the faction leaders in
March 1993; military leaders perceived the district councils as
being against their interests and objected to them, so support
for the councils was not continuous (see below). A lack of coordination
and cooperation between UN-agencies, between them and UNOSOM,
and even between the various departments of UNOSOM was also brought
up as one of the problems. Examples mentioned were things like
house rents and salary scales for Somali employees, for which
agencies and departments were making their own arrangements. Another
point made concerned the concentration on Mogadishu, reflecting
a centralised approach. This was also seen as having had negative
effects.
Some practical lessons have been drawn from the experience of
the last years. Towards the end of 1994, UN-agencies planning
to continue to work after the end of UNOSOM began to set up a
coordination mechanism which by now also includes international
NGOs. As labour disputes have been a growing problem over the
last months, there are now plans to work out a unified pay scale
for Somali employees of the agencies. UN-agencies try to follow
a more decentralised, regional approach - Mogadishu should be
one location among others, not the primary one.
After UNOSOM:
Even though UNOSOM has now drawn to a close, Somalia, several
speakers said, has not been abandoned. The UN will remain involved
in some way, although a final decision on the shape of this involvement
had not been taken yet at the time of the conference. UNDP and
other UN-agencies are continuing to work and the LPI also intends
to continue, focusing on ways to empower and strengthen local
structures.
Some misgivings concerning the future were voiced, but the prevaling
feeling within the group was one of cautious optimism. The departure
of the UN-troops was seen as an opportunity for Somalis to do
things themselves and work out their own solutions. The military
side of UNOSOM had predominated, it was said, especially in 1993,
overshadowing the UN civilian agencies, who should now have more
scope. The importance of supporting the growth of civil society
in Somalia was stressed. Part of this would be for international
NGOs and UN-agencies to work more closely with Somali NGOs and
work towards strengthening them. NGOs and civil society in general,
a speaker stated, are the foundations of democracy: If the seeds
of civil society are not planted now, there will always be the
warlords.
District councils:
The efforts to establish local administrative structures in
the shape of district and regional councils was seen as the major
positive step taken by UNOSOM. To set up such councils had been
part of the agreement signed in March 1993. A total of 58 district
councils were formed, but their performance varied markedly, reflecting
local conditions and the way the members were chosen. Opinion
differed on the assessment of this process. That administrative
divisions made in the 1980s do not coincide with clan territories
was seen as implying a contradiction between district councils
and traditional clan-based structures. While it was said that
council members are elected by clan elders so that there is not
really a contradiction between the two, an opposing view was also
stated, citing an example from the northwest. For some time, councils
of elders linked to the Sultan as the traditional leader were
the only administrative structure in villages and small towns.
However, recently a district council has been formed, and problems
are beginning to come up, as structures like district councils
are regarded by former government officials who have returned
to their clan's territory as steps on a ladder leading them back
to positions of power. According to this speaker, it is too early
yet for district councils, let alone regional or state structures.
On the other hand, these councils were seen as the only existing
administrative structures and as a link between the local population
and outside agencies, so they should be empowered and their members
trained for their tasks - the councils may have many defeciencies
but there is nothing else. Councils work if they are adapted to
the local conditions, another participant remarked. The district
council of Baidoa, for example, was reconstituted after the withdrawal
of UNOSOM and is no longer strictly a district council, but one
of the most efficient. It is now composed of the leaders of all
the clans and sub-clans in the area, and of a technical committee
of skilled people like engineers etc. who are called in for specific
tasks or projects requiring their particular skills. In general,
it can be said that those district councils which work are those
which are based on traditional mechanisms and elected by the community.
If local divisions are strong, councils cannot function. Burco
in "Somaliland" was cited as an example; there, the
two major clans refuse to cooperate and no council could be formed.
However, divisions created by faction leaders can sometimes be
overcome by the local elders; Afgoye in the south and Galcayco
in the northeast, for example, have two councils which have agreed
to cooperate.
Social and ethnic diversity:
That Somali society shows quite a lot of diversity, in contrast
to the predominant image of social, cultural, religious and linguistic
homogeneity, came up at different points in the discussion and
in different contexts. The observations that local conditions
vary, that mechanisms found to be working in one place cannot
be replicated elsewhere, that the staff of international NGOs
and UN-agencies often do not understand the local situation, are
all linked to diversity, as are the varying experiences with district
councils. Ethnic and social diversity is not only a practical
problem for international agencies, it is also a problem of perception.
Somali intellectuals who have themselves upheld the image of a
largely homogenous society in the past, have to reconsider the
way they perceive and represent Somali society. Diversity is most
marked in the south. Several examples were mentioned to illustrate
this point. The Digil form one of the Somali clan-families but
among them different languages are spoken. People in the southern
region of Baikol were quoted as saying they are now responsible
for their own affairs for the first time since independence, as
Baikol never had a governor from the region in the past. Traditional
values also differ; e.g. a Somali scholar (Ahmed Yussuf Farah)
studied the concept of wealth in Somali society and came to the
conclusion that wealth is conceived of as camels and frankincense
- but this is only true for certain parts of the society. A realistic
understanding of Somalia's society that takes the existing social
and ethnic diversity into account, is necessary in order to come
to a viable solution; that the agreement of March 1993 was not
based an such an understanding, at least partly explains why it
remained in large part unimplemented.
Internal displacement and expropriation of property
The issue of internal displacement was seen as connected to
that of ethnic and social diversity. That displaced people should
return to their homes and property be returned to the rightful
owners was part of the agreement of March 1993, but this has not
happened. Many displaced people are unable to return home as their
home area is occupied by people from other parts of the country.
Displaced people as well as returning refugees cannot settle just
anywhere, as security, a participant remarked, is now found only
in the area of one's own clan - but what if that area has been
taken over by others? The large number of displaced people, probably
equalling the number of refugees, is partly due to forced dislocation
and the occupation of land and property. The issue of displacement
seems to be largely ignored; displaced people receive emergency
aid, but no organisation has made their plight and the reasons
for displacement its concern. The related issue of the return
of property thus is a multi-faceted problem. Land and houses were
mentioned specifically. Land ownership may be disputed, as large
farms were acquired during the regime of Barre in disregard of
older rights of ownership or tenure. There are rules in traditional
law for the return of houses (and other items), but the former
owner may sometimes be forced to buy back his house from the present
occupier.
Demobilisation and reintegration of militias
Land is an economic asset, and the occupation of land is an
expression of economic aspects of the conflict. Much of the discussion
about economic aspects, however, focused on the problem of demobilisation.
Several participants said that militia members would demobilise
themselves if they were offered alternatives for making a living.
Vocational training and the establishment of workshops for the
production of marketable goods and the provision of services was
suggested as one way towards voluntary demobilisation. This is
based on the assumption that militias follow the military leaders
less out of loyalty than in the expection of payment or reward;
military leaders, it was remarked, have very limited control over
their troops, militias can be hired privately, e.g. by merchants.
Elders, traditional methods of reconciliation and approaches to
peace-building
Somalis, it was said, have their own ways of resolving conflicts,
outsiders should only act as facilitators. Some participants saw
traditional structures as the only ones which can work, but it
was also said that structures have largely disappeared, although
traditional methods and mechanisms for reconciliation still function
or can be revived. To return to traditional structures is usually
seen as a positive step towards recovery after a catastrophe,
a participant commented, but it may not be as simple as that;
traditional ways of doing things may have contributed when a crisis
has turned into catastrophe, being unsuited for dealing with the
existing problems.
There seemed to be consensus in the group that peace-building
has to be seen as a process involving different sectors of the
society and above all as a process requiring time and patience.
There was also a broad consensus that traditional methods of reconciliation
should be used. These traditional methods are based on the moral
authority of traditional leaders and elders. The "bottom-up"
approach advocated by the LPI and others relies on the authority
of elders. The validity of this approach was questioned by a participant
who suggested that moral values have changed too much over the
last years. The armed young men who form the militias, and even
traditional leaders themselves, it was argued, are loyal to the
military leaders who can promise them something. Power now rests
with those who control things of value like ports and airports,
not with elders or traditional leaders.
The question of how to deal with the "warlords" is linked
to how their role is perceived. Part of the criticism of UNOSOM
was that the "warlords" were singled out, accorded more
importance than civilian leaders and representatives, and as a
consequence given more importance than they had had. On the other
hand, it was also said that the military leaders cannot be ignored
or excluded, even though they are not the solution. In any case,
whatever the role accorded by others to the military leaders may
be, a solution cannot be imposed from outside. Especially governments,
however, and also NGOs, often lack the patience needed to support
a process of peace-building and instead prefer immediate, short-term
action, partly in response to public opinion in their own countries.
Regional aspects and the role of neighbouring countries
Regional aspects featured in the discussion as part of the
context of the conflict in Somalia and in relation to attempts
to reach a solution. The regional context is shaped by the legacies
of the colonial period, by the legacies of the cold war, and by
environmental problems common to the countries of the Horn of
Africa. All these factors have to be kept in mind in order to
understand people's reactions and attitudes, it was said.
Neighbouring countries, especially Djibouti and later Ethiopia,
played an active role in attempts to find a solution, while the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was much behind. The OAU should
be more involved than it has been so far; it was overshadowed
by the UN and UNOSOM, but now the OAU should be given and take
over more responsibility, providing the framework for initiatives
by other intergovernmental organisations. Although the approach
used by governments and intergovernmental organisations was criticised
for being oriented at the military leaders only and for aiming
at the signing of formal agreements - which may not be implementable
on the ground -, it was also said that governments of neighbouring
countries should not be excluded, that they should be consulted
and kept informed about planned and on-going activities. Neighbouring
countries can make a positive contribution, as they are close
to the conflict and close to the area. If one wants a "quick
fix" and is willing and able to enforce an agreement, it
was argued, then the approach would be to try and impress the
"warlords". An approach based on mediation as the way
to peace-making, however, would need someone close to the area
and familiar with the situation. Such a mediator can be found
in neighbouring countries, but back-up from a stronger, more powerful
actor may be needed. The peace process in Cambodia was cited as
an example of such a combination of qualities needed for mediation
and the means of enforcement; Indonesia, a state from the region,
played the leading role in the negotiations in Paris, with back-up
provided by France.
But the weaknesses of an involvement of regional states have also
to be seen, it was pointed out. Neighbouring countries pursue
their own interests, they are often not neutral and their involvement
may even complicate an already complex situation further, by taking
sides - or by being perceived as taking sides.
The role of women, the problem of differing values, and Islamism
as an emerging social force
Women are an emerging social force in Somalia. Women's groups
pushed for their inclusion in the negotiation process leading
to the agreement of armed factions in March 1993, and this agreement
in fact stipulates that women are to be included in the district
and regional councils. Women can and do exert influence, as shown
for example by the release of a kidnapped staff member of an international
NGO after women had thrown stones at the kidnappers when they
came across them on the major market place, and women have been
actively promoting peace, for example by holding demonstrations.
Women shoulder a much larger share of the burden of looking after
children and of ensuring the survival of their kin than men -
among refugees and exiles abroad as well, it is the women much
more than the men who send money to relatives back home. Women
can be a strong force, but ... There is unanimity in all circles
in Somalia, a participant commented, whatever their disagreements
in other areas may be, to prevent women from sitting in the councils
or from taking part in meetings. The second "but" raised
by a participant was that a more widespread introduction of Sharia
(Qoranic) law would kill all hopes of women becoming a stronger
force in the society and of their assuming a more active and visible
role.
The issue of Islamism was not discussed in detail, but it came
up at several points in the discussion. Assessments of Islamistic
tendencies varied. A strong influence of Islamism (or Islamic
fundamentalism, as it is often called) can be a problem; for example,
UN-agencies have left from the district of Luq, where the dominance
of Islamists appears to be by now unchallenged, after a staff
member had been killed. On the other hand, Islamists may be a
force of social order; their influence was said to be strong in
Baidoa and the surrounding area, which was also cited as an area
where clan leaders and elders have been quite successful in establishing
a measure of public order and security. What emerged from the
discussion was that Islamism may be both a constructive and a
problematic force, depending on wether there are other social
forces to challenge its predominance or not.
A question raised in this connection relates to the issue of Islamism
and the more general one of finding a solution for the conflict(s)
in Somalia. It was put in terms of values: Even if we all agree
that a solution cannot be imposed from outside and that it has
to be a Somali solution, what if such a Somali solution contradicts
Western European values? Sharia punishments (amputation of hands
and feet) may be a Somali solution to the problem of insecurity,
but they are in clear contradiction to European values, so can
or should Europeans support that? Somalis should be left to do
things their own way, but that way may not necessarily be peace
or be in accordance with Western Europen values - should we, i.e.
Western European governments, churches and others, support it?
There are no easy answers, and the question was left open in the
discussion.
Coordination and cooperation between agencies and the role
of Somali NGOs
Until March 1995, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
in Somalia was the coordinator for the UN-agencies. In October
1994, UN-agencies began to set up a mechanism for coordinating
their activities, as by then, it had become clear that UNOSOM
would not be extended. The UN Coordination Team UNCT coordinates
on all matters of security, on communication, on air transport,
which is organised jointly for all UN-agencies, on operational
logistics and tries, wherever possible, to ensure complementarity
of programmes. UNDP is the lead agency, its resident representative
is also acting as the coordinator for humanitarian aid. Regional
sub-committees of UNCT are being set up, in which international
NGOs working in those locations are participating along with the
UN-agencies.
Concerning the past, several critical comments were made. That
there has been a lack of coordination between the various UN-agencies
and even within UNOSOM, among its departments, was one of them.
Cooperation and consultation between UN-agencies and international
NGOs was also commented on. Until June 1993, UNOSOM, UN-agencies
and international NGOs had met regularly for consultation, but
later, there were no meetings except for the security briefings.
Somali NGOs had not been included in the agencies' consultation
meetings. From June 1993 onwards, international NGOs held regular
meetings in Mogadishu together with Somali NGOs, but UN-agencies
did not participate, although some of their staff members sometimes
attended meetings on an individual basis. With the support of
international NGOs, a consortium or forum of Somali NGOs was created
in 1994.
While cooperation was seen as desirable, it was also pointed out
that there are difficulties both ways. It is not always easy for
Somali NGOs to deal with international NGOs; they have their own
agendas, their mandates are not always clear to Somali NGOs, and
they are much better equipped and stronger than local NGOs. Cooperation
between international NGOs may also be a problem; an example was
mentioned of two international NGOs being in deep conflict and
practically splitting the community in which they were working.
More generally, NGOs tend to work with particular groups which
may create divisions in the community, it was said, even if specific
problems do get solved by an NGO programme.
Some critical comments were also made on the short-term interventions
of NGOs specialising in emergency relief. For such short-term
programmes, structures are created by the NGOs which collapse
immediately once the NGOs withdraw, as they were not rooted in
local structures. Local structures, local initiative and coping
mechanisms may be overwhelmed by international NGOs, and their
withdrawal may leave the local community even weaker than before
instead of stronger. In spite of such criticism, however, the
role of international NGOs was seen as important. International
NGOs as well as UN-agencies should work more closely with Somali
NGOs, it was said. About 320 Somali NGOs have been registered
in Mogadishu. While some of them have been formed in response
to the UN and international NGOs looking for indigenous NGOs,
others are committed and have been created as attempts at self-help.
These Somali NGOs should be supported and strengthened, both with
a view to make projects sust!
ainable and in order to strengthen civil society.
Security was also raised as a concern. The withdrawal of UNSOM
opens new opportunities for NGOs, it was said. They should ask
local communities to take care of security for them; if a project
supported or initiated by an international NGO meets local needs,
the community concerned will make an effort to make the project
possible.
The question of Somaliland
This issue was discussed only briefly. There are positive
developments which should be supported, it was said, instead of
standing aside and waiting for the government of the "Somaliland
Republic" to fail. If the people of Somaliland create stability
in their region and hold a referendum, a participant said, the
declaration of independence will eventually be recognised by the
south of Somalia. Concerning international recognition, there
was overall consensus in the group that the international community
should not force the issue one way or the other.
Annex: The conflict in Somalia
The state of Somalia was created out of the (at that time
voluntary) union of former British-Somaliland and former Italian
Somalia in 1960; in the wake of the Second World War, Italian
Somalia had become a UN-trust territory under Italian administration
after a period of British administration. Both territories became
independent separately, the British colony on June 26, the Italian-administered
area on July 1, and the union also became effective on that date.
The remaining area inhabited by the Somali people forms part of
the neighbouring states of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. The Somali
people are in their majority nomads or have a nomadic background,
but up to one third are by tradition settled agriculturalists
or agro-pastoralists; in the 1980s, before the Somali state collapsed,
about one third of Somalia's population was urban. There are also
non-Somali minorities, mainly the so-called "Bantu"
who are agriculturalists of East and Southeast African origin
living along the two perennial rivers in the south, the fishing
communities living along the southern coast, and the population
of the old coastal cities descended partly from Arab, Persian
and Asian immigrants. Another distinct minority are the so-called
occupational groups, who traditionally perform certain crafts
and services such as blacksmithing, tanning, hairdressing and
circumcising of boys and girls; their origin is uncertain, but
their social status is traditionally considered low.
The traditional social structure of the Somali people is based
on patrilineal descent groups. There are six major clan-families
which are subdivided into clans, these again into sub-clans and
so on. A number of clans and groupings of clans have traditional
leaders whose office is hereditary within certain families, while
others do not. The term "elder" includes such traditional
leaders, but in a more general sense refers to older men, who
command personal respect and thus have a moral authority based
on their standing and good reputation within the community. Elders
are turned to for solving conflicts within and between communities,
ranging from marital problems to blood feuds and fighting between
clans or clan-segments. Ethnic minorities and the occupational
groups do not form part of this clan system, which thus encompasses
most, but not all of Somalia's population.
After a period of parliamentary multi-party democracy, Somalia
came under military rule in October 1969 with a bloodless coup
led by Mohamed Siad Barre. The military regime proclaimed scientific
socialism as a unifying ideology to overcome the divisiveness
of the clan system and turn Somalia into a modern, industrialised
state. In the context of the cold war, an alliance with the then-Soviet
Union was made which generously supplied the growing army. An
attempt in 1977 to unite "Western Somalia", i.e. those
Somali-inhabited areas forming part of the Ethiopian state, with
Somalia by military force, ended in defeat. Barre had broken off
relations with the Soviet Union, which then supported Ethiopia
with massive military aid against Somalia, while the hoped-for
US-support did not immediately materialise; a military aid agreement
with the USA was only signed in 1980. In the course of the 1980s,
the regime of Barre became increasingly repressive, its power-base
narrowing to an alliance of essentially three clans.
As the interstate conflict was still unresolved and Somalia supported
armed groups fighting against the regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam,
armed opposition to Barre found support in Ethiopia and guerilla
warfare began on a limited scale in 1982. In April 1988, Ethiopia
and Somalia came to an agreement to mutually end support for armed
opposition groups, demilitarise the border and resume diplomatic
relations. An immediate consequence was the beginning of full-scale
war in northern Somalia, as the SNM (Somali National Movement),
based among the Issaq-clans in the formerly British northwest,
reacted to the request to disarm or remove its fighters from Ethiopia
with an attempt to push the government army out of the main northern
cities. Aireal bombardment and artillery shelling pushed the SNM
guerillas out of the towns, but scorched-earth tactics aimed at
the rural population could not dislodge them from the countryside.
At least 50.000 people were killed, most of them civilians, and
about 400.000 fled to Ethiopia. In early 1989, war spread to the
south as dissatisfaction grew within the government army and soldiers
mutinied and defected to form clan-based militias. Later in the
year, militias formed in central Somalia, and civil unrest spread
into the capital city Mogadishu. Major donors withdrew their support,
state structures crumbled, the government army dissolved and finally,
in January 1991, Barre fled from Mogadishu. One faction of the
opposition to Barre proclaimed an interim government headed by
Ali Mahdi Mohamed, which was immediately rejected by most other
factions. While factional war began in southern Somalia, the north
slowly turned towards peace. In May 1991, the "Republic of
Somaliland" was declared as an independent state in the boundaries
of the former British colony, and elders started to seek reconciliation
between the Issaq-clans and the neighbouring clans which more
or less had supported Barre during the war. While this proved
fairly successful, clan-based conflict broke out among the Issaq
in 1992. Eventually, elders of all clans in Somaliland brought
an end to this conflict and in May 1993, elected a new president,
confirming the declaration of independence. The northeast had
largely escaped the war and remained fairly quiet. But southern
Somalia was devastated by the factional fighting; in 1992, famine
killed an estimated 300.000, many of them children, and the number
of refugees abroad went up to about a million, while hundreds
of thousands more were displaced within the country.
After failed attempts by, among others, the governments of Djibouti,
Italy and Egypt to broker a ceasefire and reach a political settlement,
the UN-Secretary General sent an envoy to Mogadishu at the beginning
of 1992. In March, a ceasefire negotiated under UN auspices took
hold in Mogadishu, but not elsewhere. Mohamed Sahnoun became the
first Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in
April, a small team of UN-monitors arrived in July, and a first
contigent of 500 lightly-armed UN-"blue helmets" was
stationed in Mogadishu in September 1992. As the problems of security
for international aid organisations, of plunder and diversion
of aid, and of extortion of payment for use of ports, airstrips
and major roads remained - the UN-troops themselves had to employ
armed militias as security guards -, the decision by then-US-president
Bush to launch a military intervention with a UN-security council
mandate, provided other states would also participate, had broad
international acceptance. On December 9, 1992, US-soldiers started
to arrive in Mogadishu, joined by smaller contingents of troops
from about 20 countries, including several African states. Up
to 38.000 soldiers were stationed in eight locations in southern
Somalia with a mandate to use "all necessary means"
in order to create and ensure "a secure environment"
for humanitarian aid. In January and March 1993, leaders and delegates
of fifteen factions met in Addis Ababa. By that time, several
factions had formed an alliance, the SNA (Somali National Alliance),
led by General Mohamed Farah Hassan 'Aideed', while the others
were in the process of aligning themselves around the second major
armed group in Mogadishu headed by Ali Mahdi Mohamed. All fifteen
factions eventually signed a peace agreement, which, however,
remained in most parts unimplemented. In May, the US-led "Operation
Restore Hope" was replaced by UNOSOM 2, which had been given
a broad mandate by the security council to support and, if need
be, enforce the agreement signed in Addis Ababa.
Just one month later, UN-troops were attacked by militias of the
SNA, followed by retaliatory air-attacks executed by US-troops.
Until October, UNSOM, under US-military leadership, was effectively
engaging in a war with the SNA in Mogadishu. There was growing
international criticsm of civilian deaths caused by UNOSOM military
action, and after a battle had left a number of US-American soldiers
dead and more wounded, public and congressional opinion in the
USA changed; President Clinton was forced to announce a definite
date for the final withdrawal of all US-soldiers from Somalia.
By March 1994, all troops from the USA, Canada, and Western Europe
had been withdrawn, leaving only contingents from Third World
countries, and the mandate of UNOSOM had been changed to a mainly
humanitarian one. UNOSOM was gradually scaled down, and finally
ended in March 1995, with only sporadic fighting, but with the
conflict essentially unresolved.