Copyright 1993 Newsday, Inc.Newsday

December 6, 1993, Monday

Hunting Down Aidid; Why Clinton changed mind

SERIES: Mission in Somalia. A year ago this week, the first U.S. troops President Bush committed arrived in Somalia. It was to be a humanitarian mission. But policy began to change in August, when President Bill Clinton sent in a Special Operations force to capture the warlord Aidid. This report looks at that decision and its consequences. Second of 4 Parts

By Patrick J. Sloyan.

The first attempt to grab Gen. Mohamed Farrah Aidid had gone badly.

On Aug. 30 the U.S. Delta Force and members of the 75th Ranger Regiment cascaded from helicopter ropes into the worsening violence in Mogadishu. Their primary target turned out to be an empty building. The secondary target included one man who looked like Somalia's dominant political leader but turned out to be a member of the UN Relief Mission. He was released four hours later with profuse apologies from a U.S. Army colonel.

At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Les Aspin was upset. "We look like the gang that can't shoot straight," Aspin said, according to an aide who attended the session with senior military advisers.

In public there had been no mention of the Special Operations team dispatched by President Bill Clinton on Aug. 22 with orders to capture the warlord and spirit him offshore to face murder charges before a panel of African judges. In a meeting with reporters, Pentagon spokeswoman Kathleen de Laski mentioned only the Rangers, a light infantry force that she said represented no change of U.S. policy in Somalia.

"This is not an effort to go after one man," she said. "It's an effort to improve the overall situation in Mogadishu." But in fact the Aug. 30 operation had all the earmarks of the kind of "snatch" operation perfected by the Delta Force. That first try to grab Aidid was painless compared to the seventh and final effort five weeks later.

On Oct. 3 the elaborate American effort to capture Somalia's leading politician ended in fierce battle that left 18 Americans dead and 77 wounded. More than 300 Somalis were killed and 700 wounded. When the gunsmoke cleared, Clinton had suffered a major setback and left Aidid with a surprising victory.

A Newsday examination of decisions leading up to the battle showed that in private Clinton was under intense pressure to change his policy after ordering the clandestine mission Aug. 22. In the week before the Oct. 3 firefight, Newsday found, he had moved from a "hang tough" stance to the verge of halting the hunt for Aidid.

At first - within days of the Special Operations team deployment - Clinton had signaled a new and tougher line against Aidid. At an Aug. 23 White House meeting it was decided that Aspin would soon give a major policy address; four days later he pledged that the United States would stay in Somalia until warlords were disarmed, violence had ceased and a new Somali police force was established.

But the shift was quickly attacked in Congress, most notably by Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.), chairman of the appropriations committee. He vowed to cut off U.S. funds for the expanded mission, claiming it should "either be specifically endorsed by Congress or we should pack up and go home. My vote is for the latter," he said. Byrd noted he was inspired, in part, by his failure to vigorously oppose the Vietnam War.

In Mogadishu the hard-line tactics against Aidid rattled U.S. allies. Italy moved its contingent of troops out of the city to the safer suburbs; the French government criticized the breakdown in efforts for a political settlement with Aidid.

Meanwhile, U.S. military concerns about locating Aidid in the dusty alleyways of Mogadishu had become a reality. At least four risky missions ended in failure because of bad intelligence, according to U.S. commanders in Somalia.

From the outset Marine Gen. Joseph Hoar of Central Command, the military headquarters responsible for Somalia, had argued that without adequate intelligence, a Special Operations force would be useless. And military intelligence capability had been reduced as most U.S. combat troops were withdrawn as ordered by Clinton three months earlier.

"They argued that the Delta Team was worthless unless it had good intelligence," said one participant in the debate, who, like many officials, spoke on condition of anonymity. "Then it was decided to send in the CIA. But the CIA said there was no point in going into Mogadishu unless the snatch team was there. It went on like that."

In late June a CIA team skilled in intercepting communications and other techniques was dispatched to Somalia. They were able to listen in on satellite telephone and radio communications with Aidid's associates. "But Aidid never called them," said one U.S. official. "He went into deep cover."

The CIA high-tech approach was useless in pinpointing Aidid because the warlord communicated by using dated walkie-talkies too low-powered to be detected by the CIA. And he used an old, low-power transmitter aboard a truck to make mobile radio broadcasts to his followers.

In addition, Aidid's forces kept an eye on helicopter operations at Mogadishu airport, where the Delta Force was based. "It got so we were flying helicopters day and night just to cover our operations," said one U.S. military commander.

But perhaps the biggest policy flaw was underlined during a long conversation Clinton had with former President Jimmy Carter on Sept. 12, the night before the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Clinton had invited Carter to spend the night at the White House, and they talked until after 1 a.m., aides said.

Carter had met Aidid while visiting Somalia and had gotten letters from him protesting his innocence. According to associates of the former president, Carter told Clinton that the key to success in Somalia was a political settlement. He drove home the point that without Aidid, no political settlement was possible.

"After Carter's visit the hard line toward Aidid began to weaken," said one Clinton adviser. At the same time Democratic leaders were having difficulty restraining congressional opposition to the fighting in Somalia. Eventually the House would vote overwhelmingly to either restrict U.S. involvement to humanitarian aid or require an American withdrawal.

The lack of success in finding Aidid was also forcing a Clinton reassessment. While top aides to the Somali leader had been captured by the Delta Force, Aidid remained elusive and defiant.

"[They] never came close," Aidid said Nov. 29 of the elaborate American effort. Aidid told a news conference he had hidden himself among his people.

Violent protests on Aidid's behalf had forced a halt to United Nations patrols in Mogadishu. U.S. Army Cobra helicopter gunships fired 20-mm cannon into a crowd attacking American and Pakistani soldiers attempting to clear a roadblock Sept. 9. More than 100 Somalis were killed, including a number of women and children.

"In an ambush there are no sidelines or spectator seats," U.S. Army Maj. David Stockwell said in defending the gunship attacks.

But the Sept. 9 event evoked memories of Vietnam, where U.S. troops often killed and wounded women and children. As a young anti-Vietnam activist, Clinton wrote that he "loathed" the U.S. Army tactics. As a presidential candidate, he promised to avoid such U.S. involvement by endorsing a multinational approach to world trouble spots.

According to White House officials, that Clinton campaign pledge was the driving force behind U.S. support for a UN takeover of Somalia - other countries would share the dirty work. But now, Clinton was commander-in-chief of the most potent force in Somalia, a force that had become embattled by the hunt for Aidid.

At the time of the Sept. 9 fighting, Hoar was in the city, meeting with his local commander, Army Maj. Gen. Thomas Montgomery. With the withdrawal of most combat forces, the remaining 1,120 combat soldiers were without armored personnel carriers. To deal with the increasing threat, Montgomery requested four M-1 Abrams tanks, 14 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and some heavy artillery.

"Hoar approved the request and sent it up the chain of command," said a U.S. military official. "Hoar made phone calls to the Pentagon before he sent the formal request."

On Sept. 23 the request, titled "Protection of Forces in Somalia," was rejected by Aspin. "It's not going to happen," he said. According to his aides, the defense secretary feared the additional equipment would signal to a reluctant Congress and American voters a deeper U.S. commitment.

As Aidid's supporters took control of the city, Robert Gosende, the U.S. envoy there, called for more military muscle. Gosende proposed the dispatch of thousands of new combat troops, but his Sept. 6 cable triggered a sharp rejoinder by Hoar.

"Hoar said we had lost control in Mogadishu," said a senior Pentagon official. "He argued that if more troops were necessary, it was time to reassess our entire policy."

By the end of September Congress and the worsening situation in Mogadishu caused Aspin, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Anthony Lake, national security adviser, to recommend yet another policy shift. "It was a consensus by his advisers that caused the president to change direction," said a senior adviser.

The new approach: The United States would launch an initiative aimed at a political settlement in Somalia that could include Aidid, but at the same time, the hunt for Aidid would continue.

Disputes continue among Clinton advisers over this so-called "two-track" policy, which was revealed in press briefings during the president's Sept. 27 visit to the UN.

And there was no change in orders for the Delta Force team in Mogadishu, according to Pentagon officials.

Six days after the two-track policy announcement a spy for the CIA reported that Aidid's top aides were meeting near the Olympic Hotel.

When asked later about the Oct. 3 battle, Clinton implied that UN officials might have ordered the assault. "Not every tactical decision had to be cleared through General Hoar," Clinton told an Oct. 14 news conference. But U.S. military officials offered this version:

It was about 1 p.m. Oct. 3 when Maj. Gen. William Garrison, the Delta Force commander, got the intelligence.

By satellite phone, Garrison called Hoar in Tampa, Fla. "On these missions Hoar had a list of requirements that had to be met," a U.S. military official said. "He asked Garrison the questions, and the replies met Hoar's requirements. Hoar gave the okay."

For the first time the Special Operations team would be moving into Aidid's neighborhood. "Everyone there had a gun, and everyone was angry," said one planner of the Oct. 3 mission. But six previous sorties without serious injury had instilled confidence in the troops.

With approval from Hoar, Garrison turned to Lt. Col. Danny McKnight, leader of the 75th Rangers' Third Battalion. Their last mission in Mogadishu began with a single word.

"Execute," Garrison told McKnight.

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